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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Framework in which the EUDEM project has been executed 
Needless to say, the general public’s awareness of the landmine problem has constantly grown in the last 5-10 
years, and so has the response of the international community. Political activities have culminated in the 
signature in 1997 of the Ottawa ban treaty. At the convention, the European Union (EU) committed to reinforce 
its efforts in helping afflicted nations clear their land of these deadly weapons. Given the scale and complexity 
of the problem, it would be highly beneficial to increase the co-ordination for maximum efficiency.  
 
At the EU level, civil research activities have started within the High Performance Computing and Networking 
(HPCN) domain of the Information Technologies (IT) programme, to promote industrial R&D activities in 
Europe in support of humanitarian demining operations world-wide1. The aim is to bring advanced equipment to 
the field in 2-4 years to improve speed, cost and safety of demining operations.  
 
Three ESPRIT2 R&D projects started in early 1998 and six more in early 1999. These projects aim at 
researching, developing and testing new systems for detecting anti-personnel landmines. These R&D projects 
are supported by a set of activities carried out in common, which include testing and evaluation, surveys, and 
data collection. EUDEM is one of these support activities. 
 
Other projects, outside the ESPRIT programme, are also ongoing. A lot of initiatives are starting up, even if not 
necessarily in a well structured and optimal way, and the overall European picture is not always clear. This is 
where this study also wants to help by providing scientific and technical support to Community policies, in 
addition to direct support to ongoing ESPRIT projects. This will hopefully help improving efficiency and 
reducing the duplication of efforts in R&D programmes on humanitarian demining at national and EU level. 
1.2. What are the EUDEM goals? 
The general purpose of the EUDEM project is to study the state of the art in the EU related to humanitarian 
demining technology, products and practice. The detailed goals are as follows: 
1. Establish a list of organisations to be consulted, primarily industrial companies producing or developing 
equipment, used in humanitarian demining actions, and organisations performing or supervising 
humanitarian demining operations. Also include key research centres and university laboratories active in 
this field. 
2. Set-up a public, detailed and open database (http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/), to be filled in according to the 
information provided by individuals or associations actively involved in Humanitarian Demining, or feeling 
that their products/services/research topics stand a serious chance of being used in the field one day. The 
EUDEM database is meant to be a tool for understanding the state of the art in EU humanitarian demining 
technology, products and practice, facilitating strategic decisions and interactions between the various 
parties (industrial partners among themselves, researchers with deminers and industrial partners, etc.), and 
improving the flow of information. 
3. Perform a survey of the identified organisations.  
4. Summarise existing techniques, and identify new technology developments, their state of maturity, and 
their potential impact on demining practice. 
1.3. How did we achieve the EUDEM goals? 
1. The following existing information sources have been exploited, to establish an initial list of organisations 
to be contacted: 
                                                           
1 See also the corresponding official Website at http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/hphdhome.htm. 
2 ESPRIT, the information technologies (IT) programme, was an integrated programme of industrial R&D projects and 
technology take-up measures managed by DG III, the Directorate General for Industry of the European Commission. It 
formed part of the EU's Fourth Framework programme, which ran from 1994 to 1998. 
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Internet: list of existing links and data bases 
Internal list of persons and organisations, active in humanitarian demining, accumulated in previous 
VUB/EPFL projects 
EU financed projects 
Participants lists to well known conferences in the domain 
Literature on the subject. 
2. In parallel we defined the technical details of the database software and its contents, which in fact 
correspond to the two page questionnaire (see Annex 3), which was mailed to the organisations identified 
during the previous step. The EUDEM database was gradually populated during the survey, and will 
remain an open working tool allowing updates and new entries on a continuous basis. 
3. The survey itself exploited a combination of literature review, telephone contacts, questionnaires, face-to-
face interviews, and other methods. Information already entered into the database was used as a starting 
point whenever possible. 
4. Selected organisations were visited (see Annex 4). Persons active at an organisation level, or in demining 
practice and technical development were interviewed. Also, some organisations not yet active in the field 
but showing relevant interest and/or innovative ideas were included. 
1.4. Nature of this report 
This report is complementary to the previously mentioned database; it contains an overview of the basic 
assumptions and methodology followed during the survey. It also provides a synthesis of the state of the art and 
of the general conclusions, which can be drawn at this stage. Its target audience is broad and includes the 
general public, managers, and decision-makers. Technically involved people might find detailed information, 
interesting views and comments on strategies for future activities in the summary reports of the personal 
interviews (see Annex 8). Although a case study on research projects in the US is included (see Annex 5), only 
the EU activities are covered in a systematic way. 
 
The EUDEM database is a continuously updateable data repository, which can be used as a tool for active 
search and consultation of information provided by the organisations themselves. The EUDEM database is 
accessible world-wide and not limited to organisations active in Europe. 
1.5. How was EUDEM perceived by the contacted actors? 
Generally speaking, EUDEM was well regarded by most organisations included in the study. Although it was 
often pointed out during the interviews that making available an overview of the European humanitarian 
demining picture could be interesting, criticism was not completely spared. Demining NGOs and deminers see 
huge sums of money being spent on conferences, research and surveys. The latter is done supposedly on their 
behalf, and yet financial means to do what they are actually doing are extremely hard to find. The fact that the 
money for the two activity types does not necessarily come from the same sources seems difficult to understand 
for the affected and involved communities. Yet, it was admitted by several of the interviewees that there is a 
great need to collect data at supranational level in order to avoid duplication of efforts. A certain level of 
transparency into the “why” of surveys was demanded since this seemed to form an obstacle for voluntary 
participation. 
 
2. METHODS 
In making the selection of actors to be contacted, we tried to reach the whole spectrum in the EU. The database 
now covers a population that goes beyond the list of people that were directly contacted by us for making an 
entry. Apart from an announcement through the ARIS network, no other publicity was made, since the time 
frame of the EUDEM project was too short. In order to be useful for the humanitarian demining community, the 
database should remain an open working tool allowing updates and new entries on a continuous basis, even 
after termination of the EUDEM project. 
2.1. Justification of the chosen database system 
As already pointed out we wanted a public, detailed and open database, in which each user could quickly set up 
an account in order to create and modify his own entry3, as well as carry out searches on the full database. The 
                                                           
3 Which we did ourselves whenever we received a filled in questionnaire on paper, but direct access was and is preferred. 
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basic idea was to make records containing at least some contact information and a short profile, with the 
possibility of adding more detailed information. The Web interface had to be simple and easily adaptable, 
preferably with the necessary administration facilities already available. 
 
Given these constraints, the small data quantity requirements, and the short time frame for set-up – the database 
had to be up and running shortly after the study’s start and before the mailing of the questionnaire – we opted 
for a public domain software package4, DBMan v2.0. DBMan works on a simple text file (a flat ASCII file) and 
uses a number of Perl scripts to provide a Web interface to individual records. Administrative tasks 
(add/remove/modify/view records, or add/remove users for example) can be carried out, and there is no need for 
reprogramming. 
2.2. The questionnaire for the EUDEM database 
After the initial establishment of the list of organisations to be contacted, the second phase of EUDEM consisted 
of a mailing, which was carried out in three different parts. At first 110 organisations were contacted at the end 
of January (January 26, 1999). These organisations received a one-page accompanying letter and a two-page 
questionnaire (see Annex 3). The survey was divided in three different sections: 
 
 PART I: Identification Data (mandatory reply, unless otherwise specified) – Organisation name, type, 
contact person, staffing figure, involvement in demining and type of involvement; 
 PART II: Structural data on the organisation type – Products/services/research topics, current 
activities, Specific technologies, etc.; 
 PART III: Background data on the organisations’ partners and more specific information – Comments, 
needs, references. 
 
The questionnaire is short and most questions can be answered by ticking boxes, to lower the threshold for 
participation. The deadline for filling out the questionnaires – either directly in the database or by mail/fax to the 
VUB – was placed on February 26 (one month after the initial mailing).  
 
At the beginning of March a reminder was either e-mailed or faxed to 82 organisations that had not replied by 
then. In addition, another 58 organisations that were not contacted in the initial phase, including a number of 
organisations outside Europe, were contacted. The new deadline for all submissions was set for the end of 
March. 
 
As already mentioned, plans exist to ensure that the EUDEM database will remain an open working tool 
allowing updates and new entries on a continuous basis, even after the termination of the current project. 
2.3. Typical interview skeleton 
An interview was always started by giving the interviewee a short introduction of what our survey consisted of, 
and for what purpose it will be used. Consequently, a brief overview of the interviewed organisation was asked 
for. This part was followed with an attempt to clarify the involvement in Humanitarian demining activities. A 
brief discussion was held on the past and current activities of the organisation. Most emphasis was placed during 
the interviews on the personal opinion of the interviewee with respect to a certain technology and/or practice. 
 
When specific projects – not necessarily directly related to humanitarian demining –  were discussed, we tried to 
identify the (i) Project aims, (ii) Maturity of the different technologies involved, and corresponding Cost 
estimates, (iii) Testing procedures, (iv) “Transferability” of the developed techniques to different aspects of 
humanitarian demining, (v) Technical specifications of the equipment, performances in certain circumstances, 
compatibility between different techniques, degree of success in the field, and (vi) R&D activities and 
strategies, research funding, commercial perspectives. 
 
Whenever time was available, it was a pleasure to talk about diverse topics of interest in a non-structured way. 
Several examples can be found in the written transcripts of the interviews (see Annex 8). 
 
                                                           
4 See also http://www.gossamer-threads.com/scripts/dbman/index.htm. 
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3. THE EUDEM DATABASE: ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS 
3.1. In general 
The overall response rate to the questionnaire has been very high. Out of the 168 contacted organisations, 96 
entries5 were made in the online database at http://www.eudem.vub.ac.be/, either by the organisation or by us 
when the questionnaire was received on paper. 
 
The distribution of the database entries over the different countries reveals the highest score for the UK (21), 
followed by Germany (17), and Italy (11). For the Scandinavian countries, the highest score is found for 
Sweden (8). Note that also 9 entries of organisations from outside the EU have been registered. 
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Graph 1. Distribution of entries in the EUDEM database over countries (total: 96) 
 
The highest number of database entries clearly comes from Industrial Small and Medium Enterprises with 
less than 250 employees (Industrial SME (<250 pers.)) – see Graph 2. These are often not exclusively focussing 
their production on tools for humanitarian demining. Their willingness to participate in the EUDEM survey may 
also be explained by commercial agendas. The 8 entries labelled as “consultancy” in Graph 2 are small 
companies, mostly created by private consultants. In total, 31 organisations mention consultancy as one of their 
activities. 
                                                           
5 The entries were taken into account for the extraction of statistics until the end of May 1999. Data entered after this date 
have not been considered. 
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Graph 2. Distribution according to the organisation type 
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Graph 3. Distribution of INDUSTRIAL SME, according 
to the country of origin 
 
The highest concentration of Industrial SMEs is found in Germany (5) and the UK (5), followed by Sweden, 
hosting 3 Industrial SMEs (See Graph 3). 
Page 5 
 
Academia’s (universities) take the second largest share of entries made in the database. This may be explained 
by their eagerness to participate in collaborative EU research and development projects, their policy of putting 
results in the public domain (e.g. publications, patents,…) and the less stringent constraints to protect their 
property rights. The densest concentrations of academic institutions involved in humanitarian demining are 
again to be found in the UK and surprisingly enough in Italy. They both count for 27% each of the academic 
organisations (which made an entry in the database) involved in humanitarian demining in Europe, or together 
for more than 50% of the total (see Graph 4; entries are shown in clockwise order starting from the top). 
Academia
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Graph 4. Distribution of Academic Institutions in the EUDEM database according to the country of origin 
 
Besides universities, research centres have also made a large amount of database entries. The research centres 
in Europe are mostly located in four countries, namely Sweden, The Netherlands, France and Italy, followed 
closely by Belgium (see Graph 5; entries are shown in clockwise order starting from the top). 
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Graph 5. Distribution of Research Centers entries in the EUDEM database according to country of origin 
 
Although we have made a distinction between universities and research centres, in practice both are often 
mainly/partly funded by the government, and hence it depends primarily on the countries’ strategy for 
organising research whether a certain research activity is carried out in universities or in separate research 
centres. Graph 4 and Graph 5 show that the EU hosts a very large independent research potential, compared to 
the industrial involvement. 
3.2. Involvement in humanitarian demining 
The 87 European organisations that filled in the field concerning the type of involvement in demining, are all 
mentioning mine detection, either or not combined with clearance/destruction and/or survey/mapping. Out of 
the 87 organisations, 64 (i.e. 74%) declared to be involved in mine detection and the remaining 23 (i.e. 26%) 
mention a combined involvement in mine detection together with Clearance/Destruction and/or 
Survey/Mapping. Note that the manifest predominance of mine detection in the EUDEM database does not 
come as a surprise, because we have biased the survey towards that area of demining.  
3.3. Technologies studied or developed in Europe 
In this section, we try to give an interpretation of the database entries, with respect to the main foci of interest. 
The 9 organisations outside of Europe are not taken into account. Out of the 87 respondents in Europe (see 
Graph 1), only 70 have given information on technology studies. The numbers given in this section are only 
indicative, and should not be taken as absolute numbers. 
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We find the highest focus on the Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) technology: 20 organisations declared to be 
working on or with GPR. The second highest score goes to the Metal Detector (MD), mentioned by 15 
organisations. Infrared (IR) technology is mentioned in 6 entries distributed over different European countries. 
The 7 entries mentioning Dogs for mine clearance are also spread over the whole of Europe. Research on 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) is conducted mainly in the UK at several institutes, at one organisation 
in Italy and one in Switzerland. 
4. THE STATE OF THE ART IN EUROPE 
This paragraph has been mostly drafted on the basis of the direct interviews carried out during the EUDEM 
study (the complete list of interviews is given in Annex 4, a summary of the interview contents can be found in 
Annex 8). The organisations and individuals we encountered include industrial companies, operators, key 
research centres, university laboratories and government agencies active in humanitarian demining, as well as 
some organisations not yet active in the field but showing relevant interest and/or innovative ideas. We 
concentrated mostly on detection, and partly on clearance and destruction equipment technologies; other aspects 
of the mine action process were partly investigated with the operators themselves, as well as with some 
government agencies. The organisations previously mentioned can be subdivided as follows: 
 
ORGANISATIONS TYPE Interviews 
Industry Equipment manufacturers 
(for humanitarian demining) 
6 
 R&D 9 
Operators NGO 3 
 MAC 4 (Geneva, Croatia) 
 Commercial 2 
Research centres Supra-national 2 (ISL, JRC) 
 National 7 
University 
laboratories 
 4 
Government agencies MOD, Foreign Affairs, 
Development Aid 
5 
Table 1. Types of organisations and number of corresponding interviews 
4.1. Current Equipment in the Field 
4.1.1. Mine Dog Programs 
Dogs can and are used to smell explosive vapours and/or traces, similarly to what is done at airports and in other 
security applications. Examples of application go back to the Second World War and in more recent times to the 
Vietnam War. Dogs were first employed for humanitarian demining in Afghanistan, which nowadays features 
one of the largest and most successful programs. 
 
Dog training is extremely difficult and time-consuming, and lasts up to 3 years. Two dog-training centres were 
visited, one hosted by the Swedish Army and a commercial one, also located in Sweden. The training in the 
country of origin is essential and should be continued in the country where the dog has to work to ensure the 
adaptation to different working, soil, vegetation and weather conditions and also to a new local handler. The 
handler and the dog form the demining “system” and cannot perform well without perfect matching.  
 
The price of a good dog is very high. Other limiting factors are unfavourable climatic conditions (such as 
excessive heat, too much wind or wind coming from the wrong direction), thick vegetation, as well as dense 
and/or mixed (AT and AP mines) minefields that can confuse the dogs. Daily working hours are also relatively 
short, but dogs can easily cover several thousand square meters per day (figures vary sharply).  
 
The use of dogs is far from being a perfect science, and the detection rate (efficiency) of a dog-handler pair is 
subject to rather wild guesses. Nevertheless, well run dog programs are nowadays generally accepted by most 
humanitarian demining organisations for area verification (e.g. Quality Control after mine clearance activities) 
and minefield delineation (i.e. area reduction). For these applications, important time gains are obtained 
compared to manual clearance. The use of dogs for individual mine detection is somewhat more controversial 
(although examples exist: e.g. rescue operations, mine clearance in Afghanistan). In general, mine dog programs 
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seem to be expanding (see for example the Swedish contribution to the establishment of a program in 
Cambodia). Handicap International estimates that less than 500 dogs are currently in use world-wide6. 
 
Intensively discussed issues are the lack of coherent and universal testing protocols for dogs and the 
insufficient local training for the dog and its new handler. The systems differ from organisation to organisation. 
An important discussion point is also the lack of agreement on a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). A 
number of scientific studies (e.g. FOA in Sweden) try to clarify what dogs actually detect (minute amounts of 
explosive, or a composite odour in higher concentrations, etc.).  
 
An excellent report has been published by Handicap International on the subject: “The use of dogs for 
operations related to humanitarian mine clearance”, (2nd quarter of) 1998, ISBN 2-909064-33-6, 229 pp, ed. by 
Chris Horwood, Bill Howell, Robert Keeley, Dr. Jean-Baptiste Richardier. 
 
4.1.2. Manual Demining 
Detection and clearance in Humanitarian Demining very often rely on manual methods as the primary 
procedure. The problem resides primarily in the detection phase: once a mine has been found, deminers know 
well how to remove it or blow it up7. When operating in this way the detection phase still relies heavily on 
metal detectors, whereby each alarm needs to be carefully checked until it has been fully understood and/or its 
source removed. This is normally done visually, and by prodding and excavating the ground. Sometimes this is 
the only way to explore the ground, for example when the area is saturated with metallic debris or when the soil 
is too conductive or magnetic. 
 
Unfortunately, metal detectors cannot differentiate a mine or UXO from metallic debris. In most battlefields, but 
not only there, the soil is contaminated by large quantities of shrapnel, metal scraps, cartridge cases, etc., leading 
to between 100 and 1,000 false alarms for each real mine. Each alarm means a waste of time and induces a loss 
of concentration. When manual methods follow other procedures, such as mechanical clearance, constraints on 
the need to check each alarm are often somewhat relaxed. 
 
We have not gone into the details of incremental improvements to the current field procedures, and we left 
aside the discussion of SOPs and the specific procedures to take care of intelligent devices, booby traps, 
vegetation cutting, trip wires, etc. We would like, however, to point out the importance of continuous 
developments to improve several pieces of equipment (e.g. protection items, more effective prodding and 
excavation tools, or vegetation cutting equipment) that, far from being spectacular, can make a difference in the 
field and bring real short term added-value. 
 
4.1.3. Metal Detectors 
The detectors we are considering here are electromagnetic sensors exploiting low frequency electromagnetic 
fields up to some hundred kHz roughly. These sensors are capable of detecting metallic objects buried in the 
ground at shallow depth, whilst indirectly providing “limited” information on their nature (depth, shape, size, 
etc.). Proximity of the sensor to the surface is usually required. 
 
Magnetic Devices 
Magnetic devices rely on the influence of nearby ferromagnetic objects, either via induced or via residual 
magnetisation, on top of the Earth magnetic field. They are called magnetometers, or gradiometers when used 
in a differential arrangement. These very sensitive devices are usually employed to detect large ferromagnetic 
objects such as UXO and can be effective at depths of several meters, but do not react to non-ferromagnetic 
targets. They are only used in humanitarian demining when a real need exists (e.g. deeply buried UXO). 
 
“Metal Detectors” (Electromagnetic Induction Devices) 
Electromagnetic induction devices, which are often referred to as “metal detectors”, are active devices capable 
of detecting tiny amounts of metal (from a fraction of a gram onwards) at shallow depths. They are still to the 
best of our knowledge, apart from dogs, the only detectors really being used in the field, and are probably going 
to remain in use for some time. Frequency Domain systems have often represented the choice because they 
seem to work well especially for very small and nearby objects, but they are being more and more challenged by 
                                                           
6 Ben Lark, Proceedings, Demining Technologies - International Exhibition, Workshops and Training Courses, A. Sieber 
(Ed.), 29 Sept. – 1 Oct. 1998, Ispra (VA), Italy, p 101, EUR 18682, 1998. 
7 Which does not mean that new, cheaper and/or safer disposal methods are not welcome as part of the overall demining 
tools. 
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pulse systems, and not only where ground conditions are severe (e.g. sea-water or laterite soils, see Explanation 
Box). 
 
European metal detector manufacturers are well established at international level and include Ebinger, Förster 
and Vallon in Germany, Schiebel in Austria, and Guartel in the UK. Most of these companies are small, and 
jealously guard the secrets of the trade; technical and scientific documentation has unfortunately been rather rare 
up to now. Production has been in general mostly geared towards the military market. Recently several systems 
that take into account the humanitarian demining needs have seen the light. Metal detectors designed for 
humanitarian demining usually share the following characteristics: 
 
 Weight: less than 2 kg. Price: in the 2000-4000 EURO range. 
 Size: round, oval or rectangular head. In the former case the diameter is between 20 and 30 cm, to 
achieve sufficient depth and a reasonable scanning surface and speed. 
 Operating depth: shallow, i.e. from flush (even with the surface) down to about 10-15 cm for 
minimum-metal mines, 20-30 cm for mines with an appreciable metallic content, and about 50-70 cm 
for large metallic objects such as UXO or metallic mines. 
 Electrical/Mechanical: capable of working with standard cell batteries for a long time (tens of hours), 
and usually simple to use. Many demining teams pay more attention to the ergonomics rather than to the 
pure performances of the detector itself. 
 Output: normally an audio signal, usually already the result of extensive internal data processing, from 
which an experienced operator can make some qualitative statement on the target and its position. When 
using manual methods as the primary procedure, each alarm is carefully checked until it has been fully 
understood and/or its source removed. 
 
To the best of our knowledge no current metal detector for humanitarian demining applications delivers some 
quantitative information on the object under analysis. This is astonishing at first view, since there are other 
disciplines like Non Destructive Testing where this is the case. It can probably be explained by the urgent 
priority to enhance detection performance through better background rejection (i.e. reduction of the metal 
detector false alarm rate) and achieving higher sensitivity, as well as by the need of being very precise whilst 
usually not having any a priori information on the object under analysis. 
 
A few large coil metal detectors, by Ebinger and Vallon for example, have been manufactured for the detection 
of larger metallic objects such as metallic mines or UXO. They can for example be employed as an alternative 
to magnetometers for the detection of ordnance that is not too deeply buried, or in cases where magnetometers 
can not be used (magnetic soil).  
 
Metal Detector Arrays 
Most metal detector arrays, normally one to several meters wide, are derived from commercially available metal 
detector technology and are usually employed for vehicle platforms to rapidly scan large areas. Some of them 
can deliver information not only on the location of metallic objects but also on their depth and their approximate 
size, for example in the form of an “equivalent object volume” (which can be used to reduce the number of false 
alarms when looking for UXO for example). Some systems do also employ a special suspension system to make 
sure that the detectors are always parallel to the surface, and that a constant height is maintained.  
 
European manufacturers include Förster (working within the ESPRIT LOTUS project), TZN and Vallon in 
Germany, as well as Schiebel in Austria. Förster is working on an extension of its portable MINEX 2FD two 
frequency continuous wave technology, using one large rectangular transmitter coil and 7 staggered (i.e. 
partially overlapping) differential receiver coil pairs; the final system should not be too expensive. TZN is a 
relative newcomer to the field, and is now commercialising the AMOS Unexploded Ordnance Detection 
System, which uses pulse induction and features a double layer coil system. Vallon and Schiebel arrays have 
been on the market for some time, whereby the Schiebel VAMIDS (Vehicular Array Mine Detection System) 
has been used in a number of projects; it employs combinations of 1 m wide flexible or rigid segmented arrays 
containing eight individual sensors. 
 
Apart from the use in combination with other sensors, metal detector arrays can be used on their own, possibly 
for Quality Control applications, and the set-up/maintenance of a data archive in order to compare previously 
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executed searches with new searches8 (suggestions by TZN). Applications on road and road verge, or in 
combination with a magnetometer for the detection of UXO are also feasible (suggestions by Förster). They 
obviously strongly depend on the end user and its SOP. 
 
 
 
EXPLANATION BOX 
 
Metal Detectors (Electromagnetic Induction Devices) 
Metal detectors (MDs), actually electromagnetic induction devices, are usually composed of a search head containing one or 
more coils carrying a time-varying electric current. The latter generates a corresponding time-varying magnetic field. This 
primary field reacts with the electric and/or magnetic properties of the target (the soil itself or any metallic object), which 
responds to it by generating a secondary magnetic field. This effect links back into the receiver coil(s) in the search head, 
where it induces an electrical voltage which is detected and converted, for example, into an audio signal. 
The secondary field depends, both temporally and spatially, on a large number of parameters such as the distance, material 
type, orientation, shape and size of the buried object, but target characterisation is very difficult in the general case. The 
secondary field is due to eddy currents, which are induced by the primary field in conductive materials. Low conductivity 
metals, such as some alloys and stainless steel, are in general more difficult to detect, whereas the detector’s response is 
magnified for ferromagnetic objects (induced magnetisation). 
In the case of a circular coil of radius R for example, the primary field behaves at a distance z on the coil axis as 
R2/(R2+z2)3/2, i.e. decreases with the cube of the distance far away from the coil. Given that the secondary magnetic field has 
to “propagate” all the way back to the receiver coil(s) it is not surprising that the “art” of building metal detectors consists, in 
a certain sense, in discriminating small target signals from background signals. Smaller coils provide better sensitivity (at 
closer ranges, z ≈ R) and spatial resolution, but do not allow going as deep, and scanning as fast, as the larger ones. 
Frequency Domain (Continuous Wave) Metal Detectors 
Metal detectors can be subdivided in Frequency Domain, or Continuous Wave (CW), and Time Domain, or pulse, systems. 
Frequency Domain instruments make use of a discrete number of sinusoidal signals, very often just one. They can employ 
separate transmit/receive circuits, measuring the (small) change in mutual inductance between the transmit and the receive 
coil(s) caused by the presence of metallic or magnetic objects. 
Information on the target’s nature is contained in the amplitude and phase of the received signal, as the detector approaches 
the target. Measurements carried out in background conditions can be used to reject part of the background signal itself, 
especially in areas in which the detector’s performance would otherwise be seriously degraded, such as sea beaches (sea-
water is conductive) or strongly mineralised regions, which can be conductive or iron rich. Generally speaking, background 
rejection is more difficult in heterogeneous areas. 
 
Time Domain (Pulse) Metal Detectors 
Time Domain, or “pulse”, instruments work by passing pulses of current through a coil (typical repetition rate of the order of 
1 kHz), taking care of obtaining a high slew rate to minimise the current switch-off transient time (a few µs). Eddy currents 
are thus induced in nearby conductive objects and their exponential decay with time is observed. A Time Domain metal 
detector measures how quickly the momentarily generated magnetic field breaks down, which happens to be slower in 
presence of metal. 
The eddy current decay time constant itself, some hundred µs, depends (predominantly) on the target’s conductivity, 
permeability and size. Low conductivity background and nuisance items, such as seawater for example, have a very short 
decay time. A pulse detector, which is tuned to sample only a specific portion of the received signal, can therefore be 
“easily” made insensitive to them by an appropriate choice of the delay (some tens of µsec) between the time of switch-off 
and the sample acquisition. A similar argument applies to purely magnetic but non-conductive targets, which are magnetised 
by the transmit pulse but demagnetise just as promptly after switch-off. 
 
A pulse systems is therefore the detector of choice when it comes to working in seawater or strongly mineralised soils 
(containing for example bauxite, laterite, magnetite or magmatite, which are conductive and/or magnetic) as found in parts of 
Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola. On the other hand, at least up to some time ago, overall sensitivity was probably low 
in comparison with Frequency Domain detectors, and there were problems in finding low conductivity metallic object such 
as those made of stainless steel. 
 
Given that the transmit and the receive phase are temporally separated, pulse detectors can use one and the same coil for 
transmitting and receiving; the decoupling of the two phases also allows to work with high power, and therefore to go 
deeper. Power consumption might obviously become an issue. 
 
4.1.4. Mechanically Assisted Demining 
                                                           
8 Recording the data might in fact be useful in case of controversy at a later stage, i.e. after clearance, for “going over the 
books” easily. 
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A number of machines have been tested during the past years, partially adapting them from military designs. 
The general trend goes from “mechanical demining” towards “mechanically assisted demining”, adaptable to 
local circumstances. Without pretending to be exhaustive, the following systems are currently used (see 
Humanitarian Mine Action Equipment Catalogue 1998/1999, German Federal Foreign Office – second draft): 
 
 Vegetation cutters: in many countries, and not only tropical ones, vegetation is a large problem and its 
removal (mine detectors have to be used in close proximity to the soil, and tripwires have to be detected) 
can take up a substantial fraction of the time. Vegetation cutters are used by several organisations to 
accelerate manual clearance and the work of sniffing dogs. In their simplest form they consist of 
adequately modified commercial devices (e.g. tractors or excavators). 
 Mine Clearing Flails: clearance machine hitting and milling the ground with a series of flails (long 
chains with clearing elements, similar to hammers, attached to them). The flails are attached to a rapidly 
rotating drum, and detonate the mines or break them apart. Such systems have been in use for years for 
military applications, and a number of units have also been produced and tested during the last years for 
humanitarian demining. European producers include Aardvark in the UK, Hydrema in Denmark, Patria 
Vehicles in Finland, Technopol in Slovakia. Prices start from about 500 k EURO, and the systems are 
rather large, at least 15-20 t. Clearance depth is usually adjustable, and there is a trade-off between depth 
and forward speed. Several machines are in use, for example with NPA in Angola. 
 Mini Flails: a smaller version of the flail system just described, with correspondingly reduced price and 
maintenance cost, designed in particular for vegetation clearance (see also the Vegetation cutters 
described above). Some systems should also be able to clear (shallow) landmines. Much development 
work is still going on (e.g.. in the UK at the Warwick University); some systems are operational (e.g. the 
Croatian MV2). 
 Earth Tillers: rather large and bulky clearance machines employing one or more rotating horizontal 
drums with special teeth, capable of tilling the soil to a variable depth, detonating or disrupting mines as 
they move on the field. Weight is usually at least 30-40 t (some machines have been built around a tank 
chassis), and prices go from 1 M EURO upwards. European producers include amongst others MaK 
(Rhino system) and Krohn in Germany, Bofors (Mine-Guzzler) in Sweden. Some systems might be in 
use or being tested. 
 Wheel Shovel (e.g. HALO Trust in Afghanistan) based systems for digging up mines that will be 
manually cleared afterwards, for the excavation and inspection of (urban) rubble, also for roads (road 
grader). A mesh basket is fitted over the shovel, which then shakes out the rubble; large ordnance and 
mines will remain held by the mesh in the bucket. 
 AP Mine Sifter (e.g. MgM Foundation in Angola): a drum is used to pick up the contaminated soil; it 
then closes and rotates, and the loose soil falls out. The remaining debris can be visually inspected. 
 Mine Protected Vehicle: MPVs are vehicles designed to resist AP and AT mine explosion. They can be 
modified, for example by replacing the tyres with large steel wheels or attaching devices such as steel 
disc roller sets, for mine clearance (e.g. Mechem - South Africa, also used in Croatia). 
 
Concerning the mine clearing vehicles in particular, one can say that usually the machines have to be backed-up 
by some manual method (full detection drill or visual inspection), dogs or a second machine in order to 
guarantee a satisfactory overall clearance rate. These systems are employed for mine verification and area 
reduction tasks as well as clearance of actual minefields. They are mostly used in wide areas (not in dense 
forests), and roads. Large mechanical systems, in particular the flail and tiller machines, do require substantial 
investments, not only for machine costs but also for logistics and maintenance, and can actually only be 
employed on a fraction of the total mined areas.  
 
Environmental effects, such as erosion and soil pollution due to exploded mine residuals, have not always 
been duly studied. A confidential study on the effects of mechanical clearance on the natural ecosystem has 
been carried out in Norway. More emphasis should be attributed to this specific aspect of demining. 
 
More information on Mechanically Assisted Clearance is available in the summer issue (June/July 1999) of the 
Journal of Humanitarian Demining (published by the Mine Action Information Center at the James Madison 
University, see http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/journal/3.2/), as well as from the ongoing study on Mechanical 
Support to Demining by Handicap International. 
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4.2. Emerging Sensor Technologies 
Needless to say, the detection capability, and corresponding false alarm rate, are only two of the many 
parameters that have to be considered. Others, will also strongly determine if the system will ever be fielded, 
e.g. importance of the target application, cost, size, complexity, penetration depth, simple and/or user friendly 
man machine interface (MMI), etc. The risk of R&D is, as Colin King once put it, to devise systems which 
“work best where they are least useful”. 
 
4.2.1 Enhanced Metal Detectors 
These detectors have indeed become more and more refined and sensitive over the years. Although it has often 
been said that they have reached their limits, there are still opportunities for improvement in background 
rejection, helping in difficult soil conditions, and perhaps in sensitivity. Developments are ongoing, and partly 
financed by current EC R&D projects. 
 
Next in the line of “realisable” items is probably the determination of the object’s depth. It could be delivered 
for example either by scanning the detector across the object and analysing the width of the response (or other 
parameters), or by taking at least two measurements under different conditions, for example by using two 
overlapping coils which is probably easiest. Some of these techniques are in use for Non Destructive Testing 
applications and UXO localisation. 
Giving an estimate of the object’s size is next in the wish list. In principle the object’s size should represent an 
interesting piece of information, although opinions diverge. One way of estimating the size of an object could 
consist in measuring the magnetic field over an area in order to try to calculate the object’s magnetic dipole 
moment (typically using a simple, dipolar model), that gives an indication of its “magnetic” volume. Another 
way is to try to extract the information from the time behaviour (the pulse shape) of the received signal in a 
pulse detector for example. Again, technical feasibility as well as applicability in the field and sources of errors 
have to be very carefully studied. This development is also being looked into but is probably rather tough: a 
detector’s response contains a lot of information on the target, but depends on a series of parameters as well. 
 
Another approach is to generate an image, for example by scanning a single sensor over a surface. Resolution 
enhancement techniques such as deconvolving the detector’s intrinsic response might also be tried. Whether this 
approach will be practically applicable in the field, from the point of view of the resulting resolution, scanning 
speed and cost for example, remains to be demonstrated. Imaging activities seem to be still at the research level. 
 
Another interesting line of research is to investigate how concepts from low-power electronic design can be 
used to increase autonomous operation time (e.g. proposals exist for systems that are (partially) powered by 
movement). 
 
Other hardware improvements have been suggested, such as sensors other than the ordinary coils currently 
used in metal detectors, for example giant magnetoresistive elements, or miniature fluxgate elements. They are 
expected to be broadband and provide better spatial accuracy; the construction of linear or bidimensional arrays 
should also be possible, delivering some kind of localised image of the soil metallic/magnetic contents. On the 
other hand their overall sensitivity is likely to be smaller, which might very well discourage their use for certain 
applications (their use might for example be envisaged for the detection of UXO or mines with a relevant metal 
content, but not for minimum metal mines). 
 
It is interesting to see that for most of these activities there does not seem to be a clear cut opinion neither on the 
technical aspects (realisable or not) nor on the actual applications and utility in the field. 
 
4.2.2. Passive Microwave Radiometers 
Passive radiometers working in the microwave range of the electromagnetic spectrum have been suggested in 
particular for the detection of mines placed on the surface (but covered with light vegetation for example) or 
shallowly buried mines (some cm). The actual maximum detection depth is a strong function of the frequency 
being used, soil humidity and conductivity, material type (metal or plastic) and size (AT vs. AP Mine for 
example). Increasing the frequency, results in better spatial resolution, but soil penetration can be drastically 
reduced (especially for wet soils); the trend has been therefore towards lower operating frequencies, say below 
10 GHz. We are referring here to close-in detection; distant detection of larger objects on the surface seems 
possible too, using millimetre wave devices (i.e. working at higher frequencies, for example 94 GHz). 
 
Metallic targets do indeed have a low emissivity and strong reflectivity (acting like a mirror) in the microwave 
band, whereas soil has a high emissivity and low reflectivity. Soil radiation depends therefore almost entirely on 
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its physical temperature, whereas metal radiation depends mostly on the reflection of the low-level radiation 
from the (cold) sky which “illuminates” it. It is possible to measure this contrast between the “warm” ground 
and a “cold” mine (both temperatures as seen in the microwave band) using a passive radiometer; the latter 
basically consists of a receiving antenna measuring the microwave radiation coming from an object and 
functions like a microwave band power meter. The detection of plastic targets is also possible but more difficult, 
given that they produce a much smaller ∆T (temperature difference) than the metal objects (they have much 
lower reflectivity and transparency to radiation rising from below them). 
 
Passive microwave radiometers are simpler devices than the Ground Penetrating Radar and should suffer less 
from clutter problems. In principle it should be possible to build man portable systems using rather low cost 
materials. Like many other sensors, they could be scanned over the ground to generate bidimensional images, 
with best results in dry soils, and for metallic targets and/or large objects. 
 
Work on passive microwave radiometers is also being looked into within current EC R&D projects (e.g. by 
ERA in the UK, DLR in Germany and Thomson-CSF Detexis in France), usually in conjunction with a Ground 
Penetrating Radar that might have problems with the detection of surface or shallowly buried objects. It will be 
interesting to verify if there are some applications where microwave radiometers can be used on their own. 
 
4.2.3. Infrared (IR) 
Infrared (IR) cameras are passive devices sensitive to radiation in the infrared part of the spectrum (i.e. basically 
to the physical temperature of a body). They are capable of detecting under some circumstances mines on the 
surface as well as buried mines. The detection of buried objects might seem rather surprising, given that IR rays 
do not penetrate the ground and that it is therefore not possible to measure directly the temperature of a buried 
mine. What happens is in fact that mines do retain or release heat at a different rate than their surroundings. 
During natural temperature variations of the environment it is therefore possible, using IR cameras, to measure 
the thermal contrast between the soil over a buried mine and the soil close to it. The devices of potential interest 
do normally operate in the 3-5 µm and 8-12 µm atmospheric windows9, corresponding respectively to Medium 
Wave IR (MWIR) and Long Wave IR (LWIR). 
 
When the previously mentioned thermal contrast is due solely to the presence of the buried mine (alteration of 
the heat flow) one speaks of a volume effect. When it is due primarily to the disturbed soil layer above and 
around the mine (resulting from the burying operation) one speaks of a surface effect, which can be detectable 
for some time (say weeks) after burial and which enhances the mine’s signature. 
 
Note that rather sensitive cameras have to be employed, with sufficient spatial resolution; the maximum burial 
depth that still allows detection, is estimated at 10-15 cm. In addition, results obtained with passive infrared 
imagery can depend quite heavily on the environmental conditions and there are crossover periods10 (typically 
in the evening and in the morning) when the thermal contrast is negligible and the mine practically undetectable. 
Other problems are due to the target object’s history, uneven surfaces, clutter and vegetation (which cause a 
number of secondary effects). It remains to be seen if this heavy dependency on external conditions can be 
overcome in practical applications, possibly enhancing the detection techniques. Two major approaches have 
been studied to enhance detection efficiency:  
 
 The analysis of IR image sequences, showing the dynamic scene behaviour after or during time variant 
heating (e.g. solar illumination), as studied at VUB in Belgium, and BGT in Germany. 
 The exploitation of an extra physical parameter, namely the polarisation of the IR radiation reflected and 
emitted by man-made objects, as studied at DERA in the UK, Thomson-CSF Detexis in France and 
Daimler Benz in Germany. A periodical image sequence can be obtained by continuously rotating the 
polarisation orientation. 
Both methods are creating augmented contrast between the natural environment and man-made objects, by 
analysing sequences of images and combining them into one or a few parametric images. 
 
Infrared systems have been and are being intensively investigated by a number of companies and research 
centres for defence applications, in particular for the detection of mines and minefields (mostly AT mines) from 
airborne platforms, and for the stand-off detection from vehicles, typically on roads and tracks again for AT 
mines. The only EC ESPRIT project which makes use of IR sensors is the LOTUS project (multisensor remote 
                                                           
9 The atmosphere is transparent to infrared radiation in these wavelength bands. 
10 When the soil above a mine changes from hotter than the surrounding soil to colder (thermal inversion), or vice versa. 
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controlled vehicle); IR sensors have also been used in the EC DG VIII pilot project “Airborne Minefield 
Detection in Mozambique”. In Europe we have not encountered activities using this type of sensor for man 
portable applications. 
 
Direct measurements can be coupled to thermodynamic soil modelling programs, with models describing the 
heat transfer in the mine and the ground, as well as the heat exchange between ground and atmosphere. 
Depending on the model’s sophistication level they can simulate not only the heat flow in the ground but also 
the moisture flow. This type of study should allow predicting where and when the detection can be performed 
(FOA in Sweden is among the institutions working on this). 
 
What speaks in favour of IR systems is their imaging capability (large field of view), and the recent 
technological progress yielding cheaper, more sensitive and larger sensor arrays moving towards an imaging 
quality comparable to current commercial digital cameras operating in the visible spectrum. High-end cameras 
are usually cooled so that the sensing element works at low temperature for maximum sensitivity; they are still 
rather expensive. Small, uncooled cameras are also starting to be industrialised and are definitely cheaper, but a 
factor 5-10 less sensitive. 
 
4.2.4 Multi-spectral Imaging Systems 
In reconnaissance applications based on imaging sensors, for example minefield detection using airborne 
systems, it can be difficult to differentiate the mine from the background due to low contrast and the presence of 
highly textured backgrounds. Multispectral techniques can be used since they provide more information than 
images from common broadband cameras. The multispectral systems themselves operate over several 
wavelength bands, e.g. from ultraviolet to visible and thermal infrared (0.2-14 µm). Surface laid and buried 
mines can be found due to contrast variations in the collected multidimensional image. FOA in Sweden is 
investigating multispectral analysis for mine detection and minefield delineation. Note that multispectral 
imaging has the advantage of measuring different physical parameters simultaneously, and without major 
spatial co-registration problems. 
 
4.2.5  X-ray Backscatter Techniques 
Backscattered radiation is detected during active illumination of the ground with X-rays, and basically 
determines whether or not an object is made up predominantly of light chemical elements (i.e. low atomic 
number Z). The technique is intended for real-time detection of AT mines. The system is said to be able 
(Thomson-CSF Detexis in France) to produce a 2D image with a resolution of some cm. Potential problems 
come from shallow penetration, system complexity, sensitivity to soil topography, sensor height variation, and 
safety aspects due to the use of ionising radiation. Outside Europe, research on the subject has been carried out 
during the last decade in particular by the University of Florida, mostly for defence applications. X-ray 
backscatter techniques are also used in geological studies. 
 
4.2.6 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) 
 
Background 
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) has been in use for at least 15-20 years in civil engineering, geology and 
archaeology for the detection of buried objects and soil study. The detection of landmines has been a subject of 
interest, in particular due to the radar’s potential for the detection of plastic mines. Today a very large number of 
organisations over all of Europe are working on different parts of GPR systems, and amongst the sensors 
encountered, GPR is probably the most studied. 
 
GPR works by emitting an electromagnetic wave into the ground, rather than in the air as in most radar 
applications, using an antenna which does not need direct ground contact (in other domains direct contact is 
often required, e.g. Non Destructive Testing). GPR systems usually operate in the microwave region, from 
several hundred MHz to several GHz11. Buried objects, as well as the air-ground interface, cause reflections of 
the emitted energy, which are recorded by a receiver antenna. The antenna is indeed one of the crucial parts of 
the system. Most systems are low power ones and do not present any danger to the operator. 
 
GPRs can be subdivided into four categories, depending on their operating principle. The first type is a time 
domain GPR with an impulse system, where the emitted pulse has a carrier frequency, modulated by a square 
envelope. This type of device operates in a limited frequency range, and has in most cases a mono-cycle pulse. 
                                                           
11 At 1 GHz, a frequency similar to the one used for mobile phones, electromagnetic waves have a wavelength of 30 cm in 
air and of about 10-15 cm in the ground. 
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The second type of time domain GPR is the so-called Chirp Radar, which transmits a pulse-train waveform 
where the carrier frequency of each pulse is rapidly changed across the pulse width. Frequency domain GPRs 
transmit a signal with a changing carrier frequency over a chosen frequency range. This carrier frequency can be 
changed, either continuously for example in a linear sweep (Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave Radar, or 
FMCW), or with a fixed step (stepped frequency radar). 
The terminology Ultra Wide Band (UWB) GPR is used for a system having a fractional bandwidth, which is 
larger than 25%. 
What particularly matters for detection is the difference between the electromagnetic properties of the target (in 
particular its dielectric constant) and those of the ground. The amount of energy reflected obviously depends 
also on the object’s size and form, which is a prerequisite for reliable detection of small AP mines. Spatial 
resolution depends on the frequency used, and the resolution needed to cope with the small objects considered 
enforces the use of wide frequency bands (some GHz)12, with the higher frequencies being limited in 
penetration depth. Microwaves are indeed strongly attenuated by certain types of conductive soils, such as clay, 
and attenuation increases with frequency. Wet clay in particular provides an extremely tough environment 
(penetration is very poor). 
 
System Configuration 
GPR systems for landmine detection are either designed to provide detection warnings (e.g. an audio signal as in 
MDs), or to produce image data.  
 
In the first case, adequate signal processing should extract information on the target object from the return 
signal. The final aim is to detect the targets and, if possible, classify them13. The main problem is understanding 
if and how such information can be extracted in a usable and robust way, in particular if invariant features do 
exist (independent of target orientation and depth, soil type, etc). 
 
In the second case, the area scanning should either be controlled or tracked so that the radar’s pose is known for 
each of the acquired signals (in real time if necessary). Designing a tracking system, in particular for a handheld 
probe, is a complex task due to the required precision level and the area coverage. Several types of images 
representing the spatial structure of the measured data can then be produced, for example vertical slices (so 
called B-scans), horizontal slices (C-scans), or full 3D volume representations. The wavelength of the GPR 
radiation is comparable to the target object size (centimetres or tens of cm). A radar image has therefore a 
totally different nature than an optical image (lower spatial resolution, “fuzzy” aspect due to complex 
interaction of the emitted signal with the target objects, particular noise patterns due to scattering). In addition, 
GPR antennas normally have a wide beam pattern, which degrades the spatial resolution unless appropriately 
corrected. 
 
The imaging approach is appealing, but it requires a good analysis of scanning time, data processing, scene 
reconstruction, processing power and visualisation. Scanning time performance is less stringent for 
humanitarian demining than for military applications. Moreover using GPR arrays reduces the scanning time at 
the cost of increased processing complexity. Typical data pre-processing components are: regridding of the 
measured data to the image grid, clutter removal, correction of the varying distances between the antenna and 
the ground, pose correction (note that these pre-processing steps are also used when the GPR is configured as a 
detection warning device without imaging). Scene reconstruction for visualisation of the underground requires 
solving an ill posed mathematical inverse problem, which is a non-trivial numerical problem that cannot be 
solved without sufficient processing power. Direct feature extraction from the measured data followed by 
classification based on the extracted features is an approach, which does not necessarily require the scene to be 
reconstructed from the measured data. Visualisation can either be an image of the reconstructed scene, the pre-
processed data in the form of C-scans, or an image of the classification results. 
 
European R&D 
Nearly all EC ESPRIT projects on humanitarian demining are working on GPR systems, mostly for handheld 
applications. Results are expected within 1 to 3 years. Despite the 20 years of GPR experience in civil 
engineering, geology and archaeology, we should be careful not to be overoptimistic concerning the 
development times for GPR mine detection systems. In the former applications, GPR systems are used by 
specialists of visual GPR image interpretation, and for large objects the detection heavily relies on spatial 
correlation. For mine detection, however, small AP mines have to be detected in the presence of a complex 
                                                           
12 The shorter the pulse or the wider the bandwidth, the better the spatial resolution. 
13 Detection means telling that “there is something”, classification means telling what it is (in the simplest case something 
like “dangerous, not dangerous, do not know”, ideally something like “a stone, mine type A, mine type B, etc.”). 
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underground (e.g. inhomogeneities, irregular surfaces, etc.). Providing light, user friendly and affordable 
systems with sufficient autonomy (prices of commercial equipment are gradually decreasing but still about a 
factor 5-10 higher than metal detectors) is also a main technical challenge. Tests in the field by end users should 
assess real system performances and limitations. 
 
Vehicle mounted GPR systems are also under study for application on roads and tracks, usually with the main 
target of detecting AT mines or UXO (which should facilitate the task compared to the detection of AP mines). 
During the interviews two types of systems were mentioned, (i) an array antenna mounted in front of the vehicle 
to ensure sufficient coverage, combined with imaging techniques, and (ii) a forward looking UWB radar 
combined with analysis of target traces formed by the forward vehicle motion. One ESPRIT project, LOTUS 
(start: January 1999, duration: 3 years), investigates a vehicular approach, and several other efforts are ongoing 
at national level, mainly for defence applications. The latter might partially have an impact on the humanitarian 
demining scenario. Some Quality Assurance/Quality Control applications have also been suggested, for 
example road survey after clearance, and the establishment of records describing the history of the clearance 
task, in order to compare previously executed searches with new searches and to eliminate controversy after 
clearance14. 
 
In several domains other than demining high tech GPR-like developments are ongoing, e.g. the modulated 
microwave array antennas (“retinas”) and corresponding tomographic, real time image reconstruction, as 
pioneered by SATIMO in France. Even without a specific programme targeted at humanitarian mine detection, 
it is useful to closely monitor these developments, so that specific humanitarian demining tests can be carried 
out once the technology is mature. 
 
4.2.7 Bulk Explosive Detection Systems 
Techniques that detect the explosive itself, in bulk form, should not be confused with trace explosive detection 
such as carried out by sniffing dogs. 
 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) is one of a few techniques capable of detecting the explosive in bulk 
form. Contrary to what its name might indicate, NQR does not use radioactive sources nor produces any form of 
harmful radiation. Instead it uses radio waves, somewhat higher in frequency than those of a pulsed metal 
detector. 
 
NQR has been described as “an electromagnetic resonance screening technique with the specificity of chemical 
spectroscopy”. It relies upon the resonant response of certain nuclei possessing electric quadrupole moments. It 
is being developed in particular for airline security applications, and has the fundamental advantage of not 
needing an external (static) magnetic field, like Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR). Problems are due in 
particular –as in most other sensing techniques for landmine detection – to the need for a one-sided (remote) 
implementation (it is impossible to put parts of the sensor on “the other side of the object”). Encouraging results 
have been obtained with RDX. Increasing the signal to noise ratio for TNT, used in the majority of mines, is 
therefore one of the priorities in current research. 
 
Similarly to metal detectors, the generated and the received field decay very quickly with distance; detection 
depth will be limited (depending on the type and amount of explosive, and the measurement time – typically 
seconds to tens of seconds) and the equipment will have to be used in close proximity to the ground.  
 
Concerning Europe, NQR for landmine detection has been intensively researched in the UK in the context of 
defence applications, in particular at King’s College in London (KCL) under sponsorship of DERA, at DERA 
itself and at ERA Technology (especially equipment manufacturing). No currently ongoing ESPRIT project 
covers NQR research. Whether there are at present any plans - apart from those of KCL - to transfer this know-
how to humanitarian demining, is unknown to us. R&D was also carried out in the former Soviet Union, in 
Kaliningrad, already at the time of the Afghanistan War. In this case, present efforts are likely to depend 
strongly on the funding situation. 
 
NQR systems are most likely to be used in combination with other sensors as confirmatory devices. The 
estimated cost is 5-10 times the price of current metal detectors. 
 
                                                           
14 As suggested by Mine-Tech (Zimbabwe) and TRICON (Germany) during informal discussions at a conference in 1998.  
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Finally, let us point out the activities on handheld and vehicle mounted NQR systems, currently being carried out 
in the US by Quantum Magnetics, under sponsorship from DARPA, the U.S. Marine Corps System Command 
and the U.S. Army. Initially aimed at military systems, these activities now seem to be extended to humanitarian 
demining. 
 
Thermal and Fast Neutron Analysis (TNA & FNA) 
 
Background 
There are several neutron-based techniques for detecting explosives in bulk form. All systems are composed of 
at least a neutron source – continuous or pulsed, emitting in bursts – to produce the neutrons that have to be 
directed into the ground, and a detector to characterize the outgoing radiation, usually gamma rays15, resulting 
from the interaction of the neutrons with the soil and the substances it contains (e.g. the explosive). Amongst the 
generic neutron-based explosive detection techniques we have Thermal Neutron Analysis and Fast Neutron 
Analysis (a number of derivatives thereof do exist), which are described in the Explanation Box. 
 
 Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) is probably the “easiest” and cheapest among the neutron-based 
techniques. It features high sensitivity to nitrogen concentration. On the other hand it is relatively slow, 
and is usually not suited for operation in real-time, like conventional metal detectors (second or even 
minute response times). 
 Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) has the potential of delivering better results than TNA, because it is 
sensitive to nearly all elements in explosives and opens the possibility of identifying the substance under 
analysis, but is usually far more complex and expensive. Note that in using pulsed FNA, (pulsed) TNA 
comes in “automatically” (TNA gamma rays can be detected after each pulse). 
 
The gamma ray detector is a key element of the system. According to the requirements its complexity can range 
from a simple counting device (registering only the amount of gamma photons) to the measurement of the 
energy (essential for chemical characterisation). A system with a pulsed source could in principle also deliver 
some timing information, from which the spatial position of the source of outgoing radiation can be determined. 
Such a system would therefore be able to determine the type of substances, where they are situated, and 
therefore generate an image. 
 
System Configuration 
Neutron analysis systems could typically be combined with other sensors, and used in a confirmatory role. 
Amongst the drawbacks of neutron based systems we find usually system complexity and cost, radiation hazard, 
system weight (especially due to heavy shielding), power requirements. Depth of penetration also has to be 
carefully assessed, as well as minimum amount of detectable explosive. It remains to be established if such a 
system will be practical and fieldable, if the added performance will be sufficient to justify the extra costs, and if 
improvements can be obtained in special applications16. Some FNA based systems are in use for the detailed 
discrimination of ordnance containing explosives, inert substances and chemical warfare agents, whereby the 
corresponding companies mostly provide a service rather than sell a product. 
 
European R&D 
Nuclear sensor systems are studied and designed, notably in France (EPPRA, SODERN), Germany (I.U.T.), 
Italy (INFN), Russia and the US.  
 
Problems for landmine detection include: the need for a one-sided sensor configuration, operator security, 
equipment portability, and limited soil penetration of particles/radiation. To the best of our knowledge, no one 
has yet produced a fieldable and effective system for humanitarian demining applications. EPPRA (France) is 
working on neutron based techniques within the EC MINESEYE project. INFN (the Italian National Institute of 
Nuclear Physics) is engaged in an internal collaborative research program, called EXPLODET (EXPLOsive 
DETection), over the period 1998-2000. The involvement of other organisations with the necessary background 
is likely to be strongly dependent on the financial resources made available. Note that INFN includes in its 
project budget about 25 kEURO exclusively for material costs associated to a TNA system that is probably the 
“easiest” among the neutron based systems. FNA systems are likely to be much more expensive.  
 
                                                           
15 Gamma rays are similar to X-rays, but of higher energy, and are emitted in radioactive decays and reaction between 
nuclei. 
16 TNA sensors have been tested for example for the confirmation of the presence of AT mines on roads. 
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EXPLANATION BOX 
 
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) relies on the elevated nitrogen concentration of most commonly used explosives, and is based on the 
detection of characteristic gamma rays emitted by the nitrogen nuclei in thermal neutron capture reactions. The thermal (i.e. slow) neutrons 
themselves can be produced by slowing down fast neutrons from low cost, small radioisotopic sources, such as 252Cf (Californium-252), or 
from portable electronic neutron generators17 (e.g. small accelerators of the electrostatic Deuterium-Tritium or plasma-focus type). The 
“slowdown” takes place in a specially designed “moderator”, or in the target substance itself (the earth and the explosive in our case). 
 
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) is based on the interaction of fast neutrons, mostly inelastic neutron scattering, with the nuclei of interest. 
During this process the high energy neutrons put elements in an excited, short lived state, in particular Carbon, Nitrogen and Oxygen of 
explosives and soils, by hitting their nuclei. The nuclei return to their initial state by emitting gamma radiation, whose energy distribution, or 
spectrum reflects the, chemical characteristics of each nucleus. In other words, by characterising the outgoing gamma rays it is possible to 
calculate the elemental proportions – how much of each element (C, N, O) is present with respect to the others – in order to determine the 
type18 of substance under analysis (all explosives are composed of Carbon, Nitrogen, Oxygen, and Hydrogen that is not detectable by pure 
FNA).  
 
Neutron backscattering is a different technique, where slow neutrons coming back in the direction of the source are detected, providing a 
measure of the hydrogen content of the material. Neutron backscattering is probably the simplest technique, but seems likely to only work in 
dry or slightly humid environments. 
 
 
Note that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna has quite recently started a Co-ordinated 
Research Project (CRP) on the Application of Nuclear Techniques to Anti-Personnel Landmine 
Identification. “The main objective of this CRP is to apply this knowledge to humanitarian demining and to 
make already existing prototype instruments ready for field deployment. The output of the CRP will be a report 
that describes the state of the art of nuclear techniques for identification of antipersonnel landmines. These 
research results will be made freely available for use by scientists and organisations involved in research, 
development and use of equipment for post-conflict humanitarian demining.” More information is available 
from the Scientific Secretary, Ulf Rosengard (email: u.rosengard@iaea.org, phone: + 43 1 2600 21753). 
 
4.2.8. Trace/Vapour Explosive Detection Systems 
We already discussed the use of dogs (see 4.1.1. Mine Dog Programs) and pointed out their importance in 
particular for verification and area reduction purposes (i.e. when the focus is on verifying that a given area is 
mine/explosive free or not). Research on sniffing dogs and how to complement or replace them with adequate 
sensors is scarce in Europe, compared to the effort put into other sensors (most notably GPR). More precise and 
clear quantitative information seems strongly needed. 
 
One way of approaching the problem is to increase our knowledge on how exactly dogs work, i.e. how (using 
also other senses?) and what exactly they detect and in which concentration (explosive vapours or other 
substances leaking from the mine or from its surface, trace particles deposited in and on the soil around the 
mine). Another way, complementary to the first, is to study the different processes between explosives and the 
environment, in particular the migration of explosives, leaking from a mine, in the soil and in the air. Long term 
research of this kind is carried out for example at FOA in Sweden. 
 
Sensor systems for field application should have an appropriate sampling system (of the air or the soil), possibly 
including filtering to increase concentration. Up to now it seems that sensors either have a too low sensitivity, 
are too slow or too large to be used in field applications. 
 
Note the existence of a large three year project, started in 1997 by DARPA (the US Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency) and funded at the 25 million US$ level, aimed at developing an electronic dog’s 
nose that can be used reliably in the field (see also http://www.darpa.mil/DSO/rd/Applied/UXO/index.html). If 
and when the results of this project will be made available to the humanitarian demining community remains 
obviously to be seen. 
 
                                                           
17 One of their advantages is not to be radioactive when switched off (a source is always radioactive). 
18 Examples of chemical compositions: TNT is C7H5N3O6, RDX is C3H6N6O6. 
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Biosensor 
The “biosensor” program of the Swedish Biosensor Applications AB (http://www.bioapp.se/), formerly a 
company of the Bofors group, seems to be one of the very few in Europe targeted specifically at humanitarian 
demining applications, and perhaps the most advanced (work has been ongoing since 1995). 
 
Biosensor systems are used to develop portable vapour detection systems, sometimes also called “artificial dog 
noses”. The collection system collects air and the air sample passes a filter which absorbs the molecules of the 
target substance. The filter is purged of its contents and the collected molecules are dissolved in a fluid, the 
collection system concentrating a sample of 100 litres of air to 10 microlitres of liquid. The system also 
minimises the risk of contamination through its automatic clearing process. The droplet obtained in this way is 
then brought into contact with the actual biosensor, a piezoelectric crystal (actually a Quartz Crystal 
Microbalance), whose surface is covered by an antibody reacting with the molecules of TNT. The antibodies 
detach themselves from the sensor, whose variation in oscillating frequency is then measured. 
 
Highly selective, sensitive, portable systems are under development, and a prototype for TNT will be tested in 
minefields in 1999 and cross-checked with a dog based detection scheme (typically MEDDS employed by the 
South African Mechem). These systems could be used for verification and area reduction purposes. The quartz 
crystal has to be reloaded or changed after a few positive answers. So far research has mostly concentrated on 
the detection of TNT; this also implies that, given the antibodies’ specificity, the system will not detect other 
explosive substances. Therefore, even if TNT is present in most mines, the development and the application of 
antibodies for PETN and RDX are under investigation. Overall detection time is of about 2-3 minutes at present, 
and projected cost between 15 and 25 k EURO. 
 
Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS) 
The Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS) is a detection system capable of identifying and quantifying chemical 
vapours in minute traces. Its strong points are ease of use, speed of analysis (quick answer), sensitivity (capable 
of measuring tiny quantities) and specificity (capable of differentiating well between substances). As usual, it is 
difficult to speak about detection limits, but an IMS is believed to be up to 1000 times more sensitive than a 
mass spectrometer, with relative detection limits (concentrations) at least in the ppb19 range, corresponding to 
an absolute quantity of picograms (10-12 g) for some substances. 
 
An IMS delivers as output a current value vs. a drift time, whereby the drift time allows identifying the 
substance, and the current is a measure of its quantity. IMS makes use of the different mobilities of ionised 
species in gases. Molecules enter the ionisation region in ambient air via an inlet membrane, where they are 
ionised by means of UV radiation or beta particles. Short periodical pulses on a shutter grid allow the produced 
ions to move into the drift tube, where different charged particles drift according to their specific velocities, 
arrive at characteristic times at the collector electrode and cause current pulses forming the IMS spectrum. The 
drift time depends on the ion mass and on its molecular structure, and allows the identification of the substance. 
The presence of several kinds of compounds in the probe sample results in an increased complexity of the ion 
mobility spectra, which often can not be interpreted exactly.  
 
An IMS system has been for example developed by IUT in Germany (other manufacturers might be offering 
similar pieces of equipment) as a commercially available system, with a weight of about 6 kg and prices starting 
from 30 kDM. It is portable, can operate in field conditions from a battery pack for 6-8 hours, and measures 
signals quasi-continuously (near real-time) all 2-30 s. Note that a conceptually similar IMS system, the 
IONSCAN, is currently being developed and tested by Barringer in the US for the NVESD (US Army Night 
Vision Laboratories) in Fort Belvoir, VA, for the detection of landmines. 
 
4.3. Multi-sensor Systems 
A number of ongoing research projects are aimed at combining several sensors in order to exploit 
complementary information (each sensor measures different physical characteristics), and to enhance detection 
and even classification. Sensor fusion should guarantee that the multi-sensor system at least retains the 
probability of detection of each single sensor, and moreover reduces the false alarm statistics.  
 
Since the objective of these systems is mine identification, it is important to take into account the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the sensors, as well as the environmental conditions (e.g. type of soil, clutter, 
                                                           
19 Parts per billion, i.e. capable of detecting the presence of 1 molecule in 109 (= 1 billion). 
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humidity and vegetation) in which each sensor may be used. The ultimate goal would be to fully integrate 
individual sensors, physically as well as from the point of view of data fusion. Physical integration requires 
close collaboration between the manufacturers of individual pieces of equipment, to ensure technical 
compatibility and to avoid cross talk and measurement ambiguity due to spatio-temporal misalignment. This is 
probably easier to achieve than full data fusion (see 4.3.1 Data Fusion Methods). 
 
To avoid full data fusion, easier solutions are being investigated, such as using one of the sensors as primary 
detector (typically the metal detector) and another as a confirmatory sensor (e.g. a GPR or an explosive 
detection system), possibly leaving the final decision to the operator. This can simplify to a great extent system 
design and analysis, and in a certain sense comes closer to current operational procedures, where “sensors” 
(metal detectors, manual prodding, sniffing dogs) are used sequentially. Generally speaking, in all systems an 
experienced operator is crucial for the overall performance. 
 
Multi-sensor system design and data fusion are fashionable research topics, nowadays. The underlying rationale 
for this interest is that exploitation of different sensing principles leads to more reliable detection/classification 
results by combining different pieces of incomplete or imperfect information. The risk of this approach is that 
combining insufficiently mature sensors yields an even more complicated problem than pushing individual 
sensor technologies up to their intrinsic physical detection limits. This implies that research and development of 
single-sensor data processing and pattern recognition techniques for mine detection/classification should be 
continued, and that multi-sensor system design should carefully take into account the requirements of the target 
application, the operational procedures and the complementary properties of the sensing principles. 
 
During our interviews we came across the following multi-sensor combinations: (i) MD, GPR, (ii) MD, GPR, 
microwave/millimetre wave radiometer, (iii) MD, IR, GPR, (iv) MD, GPR, NQR, (v) MD, GPR, Vapour/trace 
explosive detection, (vi) MD, FNA. 
 
4.3.1 Data Fusion Methods 
The choice of a method for merging data in a multi-sensor system depends mostly on the data format of the 
signals, which can be a 2D image (e.g. IR), a 1D time series (e.g. GPR), or a scalar value which expresses the 
detection of the presence of explosive or metal for example. Three different types of data fusion architectures 
can, in principle, be used: 
 
 Pixel level fusion: multiple images are combined to a single image, and each location in the combined 
image has an associated vector of measurements from each of the sensors. The new image is then 
processed by an algorithm such as target detection/recognition that simultaneously operates on the 
vector values. The problems of putting pixel level fusion into practice are due to the differences in field 
of view, in sensor orientation (e.g. forward looking, downward looking), in resolution, and in data 
format. 
 Feature level fusion: features are extracted from each of the sensor data, followed by a registration 
step, usually carried out at the level of regions of interest or image segments containing more than one 
pixel. Such a co-registration of features from individual sensors is often easier to achieve than pixel level 
fusion. A detection/classification algorithm can then be applied on the combined feature vector 
characterising a region of a certain spatial extent. 
 High-level data fusion: each sensor makes an independent decision based on its own observations and 
passes these decisions to a central fusion module where a global decision is made. Because the sensors 
have very different data characteristics, this kind of data fusion is probably the most accessible for a 
mine detection system. 
 
The EU LOTUS and HOPE projects are studying, amongst others, data fusion techniques. The HOM-2000 
project in the Netherlands has also scheduled data fusion for handheld and vehicle based systems in its starting 
second phase. 
 
4.3.2 Handheld Systems 
Multi-sensor systems can be made portable, similarly to currently used metal detectors. The human operator is 
indeed still difficult to surpass when it comes to taking analytical decisions in a complex environment, and there 
will always be situations where portable equipment is needed. Problems lie in producing affordable (5-10 times 
the cost of an individual high-end metal detector?), compact and lightweight systems, with sufficient autonomy, 
improved productivity (reduced false alarm rate), ease of use (ergonomics), and overall performances justifying 
the price. 
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Most handheld multi-sensor systems include a metal detector in their set-up. Most of the mines still contain 
some metal, even if sometimes in reduced quantities. In addition, metal detectors are still the only sensors really 
used in demining practice. Their inclusion should therefore facilitate the transition from single sensor to multi-
sensor systems and guarantee system acceptance. 
 
Ground Penetrating Radar is also well positioned in the list of preferences, followed by bulk explosive detectors 
(e.g. NQR) and vapour trace detectors. Other sensors being studied are infrared devices, which have the 
potential of detecting the object from a standoff position (e.g. mounted on the protection helmet of the operator). 
Microwave radiometers can be particularly useful for the detection of surface or shallowly buried objects, where 
radar might have problems. 
 
4.3.3. Vehicle Platforms 
Vehicle platforms are typically used for rapid surveying of large areas, in particular roads or moderately off-
road areas. Sensor choice as well as sensor performance are usually not constrained by power and computational 
requirements. Sensor arrays are usually employed. Position tracking equipment and platform stability control 
systems are also extremely important. Usually a combination of forward looking (e.g. IR, visual, multispectral 
cameras, UWB radar) and downward looking sensors (e.g. GPR array, MD array) are used. Near “real-time” 
processing and decision taking might be necessary at high vehicle speeds. In some cases remotely controlled 
vehicles are used. 
Most of the encountered vehicle based projects are military oriented, apart from the EC LOTUS project. 
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4.4. Technological Maturity 
From the discussion during the interviews, the EUDEM database, the bibliographic analysis of the state of the 
art, and the equipment specifications provided by the manufacturers, we have tried to make some inferences 
about the maturity of the mine detection technologies described above, as well as their cost. The resulting list is 
undoubtedly subjective, and open for criticism, because (i) we must rely on indirect evidence due to the absence 
of well established definitions of equipment performance, (ii) most of the results of independent performance 
tests are not publicly available, (iii) we have not conducted performance tests ourselves, and (iv) we do not 
share the practical experience of deminers working in the field. 
 
Technological maturity should be interpreted as a qualitative measure expressing a mixture of the: 
 State of advancement of the R&D; 
 Demonstration of detection capabilities useful for humanitarian demining; 
 Demonstration of building a practical system. 
 
Cost includes technological cost only, i.e. does not take into account the actual productivity in the field. 
Needless to say, innovation can very well come from technologies other than the ones listed below, for example 
other trace explosive sensors, or acoustical/seismic detection systems, etc. 
 
Sensor technology  Maturity  Cost  Comments 
Dogs H H-HH Used in practice 
Prodding/Excavation H  LL Used in practice 
Magnetic devices  H  M Used in practice (Magnetometers, 
Gradiometers) 
Metal detectors H L Used in practice 
Metal detector Array H H-HH (Used in practice?) 
Passive mm wave  L-M HH  EU HOPE project claims low cost 
Handheld multisensor probe including 
radiometer 
mm wave radar  L  HH Cost figure based on lab equipment 
Passive infrared  M-H H Cost is decreasing 
Polarised infrared  M  HH  
Multispectral  L  HH  
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) H  M-H  
Ultra-wideband radar (UWB) L-M  H-HH  
GPR Array M-H HH  
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR)  M  H  
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) M HH   
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) L-M HH  
Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS)  M  M-H  
Biosensor M-H  M  
Table 2. (Qualitative) Maturity and Cost evaluation for the previously mentioned technologies. Maturity indication 
ranges from Low (L) to Medium (M) up to High (H); Cost indication uses L ≈ 4000 EURO (price of a high end 
metal detector), M ≈ 2 to 5 times L, H ≈ 5 to 10 times L, and HH >10 times L. 
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4.5. EC projects 
The following table very briefly summarises the largest European R&D projects on humanitarian demining, as 
well as some primarily defence oriented projects. More details are usually available in the interview reports (for 
the EC projects see also http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/hphdhome.htm ). 
 
Project Prime 
contractor 
Sensors Start Duration, 
Partners* 
Comments 
GEODE Dassault pulse GPR (EMRAD), 
FMCW GPR? (ELTA) + 
MD (Förster) + IR 
(Marconi) 
Jan. 98 15, 4P + 2A Vehicle 
MINEREC EMRAD GPR (EMRAD) Jan. 98 18, 2P GPR array, real time 
Airborne 
minefield 
detection in 
Mozambique 
ITC ZeissLMK2000(optical), 
LeicaRC30(optical), 
VOS80C(digital), 
ReconCA860(thermal), 
AES-1(SAR) 
Feb. 98 18, 12P Pilot project  
EC DG VIII + some 
EC countries 
HOPE Vallon pulse MD (Vallon) + 
stepped frequency 
(imaging) GPR (RST) + 
radiometer (DLR) 
Jan. 99 24, 7P + 7A  Portable 
PICE Celsius Tech pulse MD (Schiebel) + 
stepped frequency (no 
imaging) GPR (Celsius 
Tech) 
Jan. 99 24, 5P + 4A Portable 
INFIELD Detexis pulse GPR (ERA) + 
continuous wave MD 
(Ebinger) + radiometer 
(ERA?) 
Jan. 99 18, 3P + 1A Portable 
LOTUS Detexis pulse GPR (EMRAD) + 
MD (Foerster) + IR 
(Marconi) 
Jan. 99 36, 4P + 1A Vehicle 
DEMINE TUI GPR (all) Feb. 99 24, 6P GPR only 
MINESEYE EPPRA neutron (EPPRA) + digital 
MD (?) 
Feb. 99 30, 5P Portable, vehicle 
HOM2000 TNO GPR, MD, IR, …  National Dutch 
project 
Mostly Hum. Dem. 
HUDEM RMA GPR, MD, IR, robotics, …  National 
Belgian project 
Purely Hum. Dem. 
mostly academia 
----------- FOA GPR, MD, IR, multi-
spectral, explosive det. … 
 National 
Swedish 
project 
Mostly Hum. Dem. 
Portable, Airborne 
EXPLODET INFN TNA, FNA 1998 36, 10P Purely Hum. Dem 
(several 
projects) 
DERA GPR, UWB, MD, IR, pol. 
IR, NQR, mm wave, … 
 UK MoD 
sponsored 
(nearly entirely) 
Defence: Portable, 
Vehicle, Airborne 
MMSR, 
DMH 
MaK, 
BGT (?) 
GPR, MD, IR, 
multispectral, … 
 German MoD 
sponsored 
Defence: Vehicle, 
Airborne 
(several 
projects) 
Detexis? GPR, MD, IR, …  French DGA 
sponsored 
Defence: Vehicle, 
Airborne 
Table 3. Largest European R&D projects on humanitarian demining, as well as some defence oriented projects. 
NOTE: DERA: Defence and Research Evaluation Agency (UK), Detexis: Thomson-CSF Detexis, FOA: Swedish Defence 
Research Establishment, INFN: Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics, RMA: Royal Militay Academy (Brussels), 
TNO: Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, TUI: Techn. Universität Ilmenau (Germany). 
*: P: Partner, A: Associate. 
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5. SMALL SCALE ANALYSIS OF ONGOING GOVERNMENT 
FUNDED R&D PROJECTS IN THE US 
The current paragraph is the summary of a report made by John Brooks, on behalf of the EUDEM project. It is 
mainly centred towards military R&D projects with some focus on humanitarian demining. 
The goals of the US survey were to determine the current state-of-the-art of US military and humanitarian 
demining technologies related to the detection and classification of anti-personnel land mines (APLs). The US 
Army-funded programs were investigated; the many US Navy programs were not. It is interesting to note that a 
co-ordination office, JUXOCO, was established to provide co-ordination for all Department of Defense (DoD) 
UXO programs; it serves as a repository of data collected at US test facilities. All test data involving UXO and 
mine detection/clearance is linked to the JUXOCO web site, http://www.uxocoe.org/index2.htm. 
 
For the EUDEM survey, three US GPR programs were reviewed; the Ground-based STAnd-off  Mine 
Detection System (GSTAMIDS), the Hand-held STAnd-off  Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS), and a 
developmental short-pulse hand-held GPR designated as the BRTRC/Wichmann radar. In general, the tendency 
to employ stepped-frequency modulation is consistent between the three main programs; the 
BRTRC/Wichmann radar uses a more conventional short-pulse modulation, albeit a very wideband pulse, ca. 5 
GHz. 
 
EMI (ElectroMagnetic Induction) has been used with some success for the detection of buried metallic UXO 
and mines. The principle is based on transmission of a wideband electromagnetic waveform.  The resulting field 
induces a secondary current in the earth as well as in any buried objects. A receiving coil senses only the weak 
secondary field returned from the earth and buried objects.  
 
The US requirement for HSTAMIDS is a probability of detection, Pd, of a mine to be 0.80 (i.e. a clearly 
military oriented specification; Annex 5 explains how this Pd is defined); the best performance with trained 
contractor personnel was 0.70, and the average performance using military personnel was only 0.30. Such 
performance has led to an 18-month extension of the HSTAMIDS program. Two systems of different vendors 
are briefly analysed in Annex 5 
 
The Airborne STAnd-off Mine Detection System (ASTAMIDS) was a program developed to locate minefields, 
and used an IR sensor as the primary queuing sensor. ASTAMIDS failed to meet US Government specifications 
due to the poor performance of the IR sensor.  The program has been realigned to study other options; the 
program is now called the Light Airborne Mine Detector (LAMD). No specific information regarding the failure 
has been made available at the time of the report. 
 
As a conclusion, one can say the US Army demining technology program is maturing, with some erratic 
programmatic behaviour due to lack of clear success of any single or group of technologies. The 18 month delay 
in HSTAMIDS and the restructuring of ASTAMIDS are clear evidence of this. The progress of GSTAMIDS is 
promising. The lack of a consistent methodology for performance evaluation and system comparison leads to a 
"floating baseline" for competing systems to meet (see Annexe 5). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
To guide the reader through the conclusions, we have classified them in 3 categories: Policy (related to 
organisational and co-ordination aspects), Practice (related to currently used demining technology and 
procedures), Technology (related to R& D for new technologies, specification of equipment and testing). 
6.1. Policy  
– EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT (AGENCY): 
Several NGOs have stressed the need for new technology to speed-up current demining procedures, but 
they are often reluctant to invest in it, since (i) every particular local circumstance requires specific 
logistics, campaign organisation and equipment, (ii) as a consequence not all existing equipment is 
continuously in use, and (iii) the investment in equipment maintenance is too high. In this respect the 
concept of a supranational Equipment Procurement Agency, acquiring, organising and maintaining a 
central pool of equipment (technical toolbox), which could be called upon by the deminers following e.g. a 
leasing formula, could indeed form the basis of a solution to meet the market requirements. Work on setting 
up such an Agency is currently ongoing, with discussions involving (at least) the JRC in Ispra and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining at the European level. The same concept should 
also be valid for currently available but expensive equipment (e.g. machines and dogs). 
 
– MINE CLEARANCE FUNDING: 
Although it is recognised that the EU should play a coordinating role in mine action programs, there is a 
generalised criticism by the NGO end users of the current EU way of working. Main recommendations for 
better operational functioning include shortening the delay in funding, reducing the amount of 
bureaucratic procedures and limiting the fragmentation in too many EU divisions with insufficient 
coordination. It should be generally accepted that mine clearance needs a continuous security of funding, 
because it is a long-term process, and not a short-time emergency action. 
  
 – PUBLIC INTEREST: 
Public interest changes quickly, leading to inefficient usage of funds. This has caused the shift of 
campaigns from Bosnia, where the mine problem still persists, towards for example, Kosovo. Working 
NGOs had to change their policy at several other occasions, simply because they depend on the demands of 
their donors. Although the public interest, highly influenced by the mass media, has placed the mine issues 
lower on the problem agenda, compared to other international issues, the international community should 
not forget its responsibility. 
 
– INFORMATION SHARING: 
Apart from the normal protections of industrial property rights, we have found many government-funded 
projects for humanitarian demining purposes, which are not releasing any of their results in the public 
domain. This is a major impediment to progress, historically resulting from the early military involvement 
in the domain. Many classified NATO reports for example could bring a breakthrough in the development 
of new technology, the assessment of usefulness of certain techniques and the standardisation of testing 
protocols. Seeing Humanitarian demining as an urgent problem (see the signed Ottawa treaty), the release 
of this information should be a major and priority topic for the political agenda. Information sharing 
between publicly funded military- and civilian projects should be a bi-directional process. 
 
– EUDEM DATABASE: 
The EUDEM database is an attempt to give an overview of the European offer within the field of 
humanitarian demining. Its goals can only be realised if updates and the possibility for new entries are 
guarantied on a continuous basis. Under these conditions, it could serve as a common data repository and a 
practical search tool for all actors in the demining sector, simplifying contacts and favouring joint efforts to 
solve a joint commitment. Maintaining the availability of the EUDEM data base requires a (small-scale) 
effort, continued over a number of years. More generally speaking, a lot of information sources on 
humanitarian demining can be consulted via the internet, but most of them are repeating the same things, 
and many of them are unreliable with respect to the information content and should be interpreted with care. 
This is of course a basic characteristic of the internet, but nevertheless we think that a reliable information 
dispatcher (e.g. JRC) could be beneficial to structure the fragmented information, to guarantee its reliability 
or at least mention its origin. 
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6.2. Practice 
– INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS TO CURRENT FIELD PROCEDURES: 
At several occasions during the EUDEM survey, the importance of continuous developments was stressed 
to improve several pieces of equipment (e.g. protection items, more effective prodding and excavation 
tools, or vegetation cutting equipment) that, far from being spectacular, can make a difference in the field 
and bring real short term added-value.  
 
– MINE DOG PROGRAMS: 
Although the use of dogs is rather far from being a perfect science, well-run dog programs have apparently 
managed to convince more than one sceptic deminer. The use of dogs is therefore nowadays generally 
approved by most humanitarian demining organisations for area verification and minefield delineation 
purposes (area reduction), which allow important time gains compared to manual clearance operations, and 
quality control after mine clearance activities. Detection of minimum metal mines is possible and 
particularly appreciated. Individual mine detection during clearance operations is somewhat more 
controversial. In general mine dog programs seem to be expanding. 
Heavily discussed issues are the lack of coherent and universal testing protocols for dogs and sufficient 
local training for the dog and its new handler. There seems to be little agreement on a Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP). A number of studies are also underway to establish what dogs actually detect and how. 
 
– MECHANICAL SYSTEMS: 
An evolution is observed from mechanical demining towards mechanically assisted demining adaptable to 
local circumstances. Concerning the mine clearing vehicles in particular, one can say that the machines 
have usually to be backed-up by some manual method. These systems are employed for mine verification 
and area reduction tasks, as well as clearance of actual minefields. Large mechanical systems do require 
substantial investments (machine costs, logistics, and maintenance), and can actually only be employed on a 
fraction of the total mined areas. Environmental effects have not always been sufficiently studied. Several 
specialized pieces of equipment are also being used, for example to clear vegetation and tripwires, to 
accelerate manual clearance or the use of dogs. 
 
– HUMANITARIAN VERSUS MILITARY OBJECTIVES: 
It is important to understand the extent to which the design of mine detection and minefield delineation 
technology is based on military operational doctrine, compared to humanitarian or post-conflict 
requirements. For the latter the needs of real time operation and testing following military practice are 
not so relevant. Hence objectives as acceptance and ergonomy adapted to usage by indigenous deminers 
and NGOs, as well as increased performance in sensitivity at a reasonable False Alarm Rate should be 
emphasized. 
 
6.3. Technology 
– INPUT FROM OTHER DOMAINS:  
It is well recognised how military procedures and technology have influenced, through a relatively long 
process of adaptation, the field of humanitarian demining, but other domains are also providing new 
insights, like non destructive testing, signal/image processing, remote sensing, Geographic Information 
Systems, medical imaging, etc. These other domains were included in our study, containing the list of actors 
claiming to develop new technological applications, but admitting not to be active yet in humanitarian 
demining. In our opinion, it is useful to closely monitor these developments, so that specific humanitarian 
demining tests can be carried out once the technology has reached maturity in other application domains. 
 
– EXISTING VS. NEW TECHNOLOGIES:  
Several end-users and national demining campaign sponsors brought up that less emphasis should be put on 
development of new technologies. The "improvement of existing technology will resolve the problem 
faster", so that the political commitments of a mine free world within 10 years could be achieved. This 
(perfectly understandable) attitude towards new technologies is also observed in other professions (e.g. 
health care and medicine), where fast and critical decisions need to be made. It can partly be explained by a 
preference to use an imperfect technique whose limitations are well-known as compared to a new technique 
with better performances that is not fully trusted yet.  
It is recognised, on the other hand, that the progress made with present techniques will not enable the 
'current people in the field' to meet the Ottawa requirements. Faster and safer technologies are badly 
needed. The discussion on this issue is ongoing, and the many visions do not always coincide.  
Page 26 
Following the same line of discussion, one should not forget that in the framework of the Ottawa 
convention every mine has to be identified as a 'real potential killer'. In practice however, when priority 
areas are defined and the remediation strategy is adapted to the urgency (e.g. fencing instead of clearance) 
only a fraction of the millions of mines spread out over the world are causing an immediate threat. Adapting 
the remediation strategy to locally defined priorities was mentioned by many government agencies. The 
need for complete solutions, taking into account all economical, rebuilding, psychological, cultural and 
environmental aspects was stressed by many NGOs – Mine Action is indeed not only about demining. 
 
– (GLOBAL) R&D TRENDS: 
Much of the R&D effort for humanitarian demining has indeed gone towards the detection of individual 
mines (usually close-in techniques mainly for blast mines rather than stand-off techniques for 
fragmentation or bounding mines). Two approaches seem to be followed, (i) either the combination of 
different sensors in one unit (a multi-sensor system), more performing but at the same time more complex 
and difficult to characterise, and (ii) the combination of a detection sensor (usually the metal detector) with 
a confirmation sensor such as NQR or neutron based techniques for bulk explosive detection, or sometimes 
the GPR. 
Some research is also currently underway on wide area confirmation methods, for example airborne 
minefield delineation or explosive vapour/trace detection (e.g. biosensors) to complement or replace dogs, 
in order to save precious time by concentrating on areas which really need to demined. The amount of such 
research is nevertheless rather small in the civil sector, compared to the importance of the subject, and 
compared to the effort put into other sensors (most notably GPR). This might change in the near future, 
especially concerning the detection of explosives. 
The use of sensors for specialised applications (e.g. Quality Assurance in some scenarios) has probably 
not yet received sufficient attention (see comments in the GPR and metal detection sections, 4.2.6 and 
4.1.3). 
Evolution should be governed by the following set of keywords (NPA): "Safer, Faster and Cheaper". 
 
– SENSOR TECHNOLOGY MATURITY: 
A summarising view on the maturity of mine detection technologies is undoubtedly subjective and open for 
criticism. Taking into account that (i) we have to rely on indirect evidence due to the absence of well 
established definitions of equipment performance, (ii) most of the results of independent performance tests 
are not publicly available, (iii) we have not conducted performance tests ourselves, and (iv) we do not share 
the practical experience of deminers working in the field, we nevertheless think that Table 2 in 4.4 is useful 
in fixing the large tendencies in technology maturity and equipment cost.  
Ground Penetrating Radar is undoubtedly the most popular sensing principle for R&D in humanitarian 
demining. The new developments in metal detection try to extend target detection towards target depth, 
volume, and shape estimation as well as imaging. Microwave radiometers could be complementary to GPR 
for imaging and detection of buried mines at shallow depths. IR sensors will probably always require a 
physical reasoning from the operator to yield good results. Image sequence analysis is a good candidate for 
boosting op IR imaging performances for the detection of man-made targets. The techniques mentioned 
above rely on the detection of an indirect parameter or pattern (e.g. temperature difference, dielectric 
constant, reflection coefficient..) from which subsequently the presence of a mine is inferred. Direct 
detection of explosives and/or analysis of its composition are achieved by bulk and vapor trace detectors. 
The latter are perceived as potentially important developments. 
 
– DETECTION  AND NEUTRALISATION (AN INTEGRATED APPROACH): 
In the surveyed research programs, a tendency is observed to combine the detection and neutralisation 
phases of demining. It is clear that this is motivated by the urge to speed-up the process. In this area, 
compound vehicular platforms are being developed for detection, marking and neutralisation. Particular to 
humanitarian demining,  real time operation is a less stringent requirement than for military applications. 
 
– INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are recognised as useful tools for managing, planning, monitoring 
and designing solutions concerning global infrastructure and environmental issues. For demining only, it is 
often perceived as being too complex to put into practice. Nevertheless at several occasions, situations were 
encountered where the transmission of information between different demining organisations, working in 
the same geographic area, caused uncertainty about the work already carried out and lead to duplicated 
efforts. Supranational incentives and co-ordination could avoid the reluctance to share information, help 
in simplifying the user interface and standardising products. Low cost and commercially available 
technology for localisation (e.g. differential GPS, Glonass, and other forthcoming satellite networks), used 
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in conjunction with GIS and wireless communication could provide objective and easily collectable data on 
minefield areas. Training, education and demonstrations could achieve promotion for the wide spread usage 
of these technologies. The know-how, if not available already, is certainly not too complex to acquire. 
Adequate maps (cartography) are also badly needed in a number of circumstances. 
 
– NEW CONCEPTS FOR USING ANIMALS AND PLANTS:  
At the conceptual level, some attempts to introduce really new technologies in the field of humanitarian 
demining have been noticed (e.g. extension of the detection by animals to other types of animals than solely 
dogs - cockroaches, rats, fluorescent wasps, plants that change colour when they come into contact with 
explosive molecules). These imply a complete change of attitudes and ways of working. The more 
conservative end users are reluctant to even consider these new concepts.  
 
– AIRBORNE MINEFIELD DETECTION / REMOTE SENSING: 
The role of remote sensing vs. ground based methods has not yet been fully identified. For airborne 
minefield detection on realistic surfaces (100 up to 1000 km2), terabytes20 of digital data have to be 
analysed. Setting-up a measurement campaign is a complex and expensive operation. Although for civilian 
applications on-board processing might not be a primary requirement, even off-line analysis requires huge 
computing facilities. The development of remote sensing systems has been primarily done in the military 
context, results are often not publicly available, and it is unlikely that these systems will be operational for 
civilian applications in the near future. Several platforms have been tested, like airships, aircrafts, drones, 
and helicopters. The privileged sensors are the optical and the IR imager, although UWB-SAR seems to 
yield promising results for the future. On certain soil types and non-densely vegetated areas the airborne 
minefield delineation results are reported to be successful (e.g. deserts). In our opinion, aerial photographs 
might be useful, as pictorial information for end users to help understand the structure of the local terrain. 
Change detection by analysis of satellite data is ongoing and could be attractive as a supplementary 
exploitation of commercial satellite image dissemination.  
 
– SIGNAL AND IMAGE PROCESSING 
During the EUDEM survey, it became obvious that it is much easier to gather information about the 
physical properties and principles of demining equipment, than about the signal processing architecture 
inside the equipment. Almost no precise information could be obtained about the actual algorithms for 
clutter rejection, feature extraction, and classification. In this area there is clearly an important task for 
universities and research centres publishing in the public domain. Several levels of data fusion have been 
defined in 4.3.1. No concluding results could be found, at this stage. Besides continuation of the data fusion 
efforts, also further developments on pushing the full single sensor systems (physical set-up combined with 
appropriate signal processing) towards their intrinsic physical detection limits. 
 
– SIGNATURE DATABASE: 
Due to the accepted high clearance rate (99.6 %) required for civilian applications, equipment evaluation 
and detection algorithms should inevitably be tested on an independent (i.e., different from the learning set 
used for designing the algorithms) and large data-set. Moreover it appears that the signal processing is 
highly dependent on the particular sensor implementation and the measurement conditions. This means that 
local detection circumstances (e.g. environmental factors such as humidity, soil type, vegetation, 
temperature), data acquisition protocol (e.g. sensor height, scanning type,…) and object related parameters 
(e.g. mine type, depth, orientation) have to be taken into account. At this moment, only fragmented pieces 
of information exist (e.g. MACADAM, EPFL, VUB,…). To build a useful signature database is a major 
enterprise requiring a well-defined methodology and sufficient funding. A supranational initiative is 
recommended, which is currently being prepared under the co-ordination of the JRC. 
 
– TESTING AND EVALUATION: 
The implementation of specifications for testing protocols is again a supranational mission. The existence 
of several ad hoc protocols is a well-known fact after this survey, but they remain proprietary information, 
which is inaccessible for the research community. Annex 5 points out for example that probability of 
detection and probability of false alarm are useless specifications without at least a clear explanation of the 
methods used to determine the performance. 
In order to test or to compare new technologies that are in the phase of development or have been 
developed, a possibility should exist to gain confidence by application on the field.  
                                                           
20 1 Terabyte = 1012 bytes = 1000 Gigabytes (one CD-ROM contains about 0.65 Gigabytes). 
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The establishment of a joint working group, focussing on the development of testing methodologies and the 
design of standards for sensor and system assessment, is currently ongoing. At the European side, the 
existing CADMOS21 workgroup, promoted by JRC, acts as the core group. The demining community 
would appreciate dissemination of the current status and intermediate results. Work is also being done at 
international level to set up an international network of test, evaluation and certification centres. 
 
– USER REQUIREMENTS / EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION: 
The problem of defining precise requirements, i.e. of some authority(ies) clearly stating what is required for 
which type of application – especially concerning sensors – and how to measure it, has been raised by 
several industrial companies. Ongoing efforts to come up with Statements of Operational Requirements 
(SOR), sort of catalogue of end user needs (“wish lists”), and related Statements of Equipment 
Requirements (SER) (the technical specifications for equipment to address the users’ needs) are certainly a 
step in the right direction. These are likely to be country dependent, but a standardisation effort will be 
made. Work is ongoing, in Europe, at JRC and the Geneva International Centre. 
This information, perhaps together with examples of how demining is actually carried out (e.g. taken from 
the end users’ Standard Operation Procedures, or SOP), should according to us reach all interested parties in 
a timely and precise manner. This could be for example in the form of a newsletter, or a simple reference to 
an updated Web page. Tightly coupled to this is a demand, expressed by some, for certification of 
equipment developed by industry and R&D centres to ensure conformity with the user needs and suitability 
for the application in question22. 
 
 
The current report is a summary of the state of the art in the EU related to humanitarian demining technology, 
products and practice. Sometimes the conclusions reflect personal opinions of the authors, and some of them 
had to be simplified leaving out nuances in order to make their message clear. For detailed information and the 
origin of the individual conclusions, the reader is referred to the substantial amount of information coming from 
different sources in the Annexes of the report.  
                                                           
21 Committee of Advisors: Detection of Mines based on Operational Standards. 
22 This point is obviously related to the question of who is responsible in case of system error or failure. 
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8. GLOSSARY 
Sources: 
http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/category/ 
http://www.demining.brtrc.com/policy/publicpolicy/intragny/summary.htm 
 
Term Definition 
Anti-personnel 
Landmine (APL) 
The term "anti-personnel landmine" means any munition placed under, on, or near the ground 
or other surface area, either placed by humans, or delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar, any 
similar means, or dropped from an aircraft and which is designed, constructed or adapted to 
be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. The term "anti-
personnel landmine" does not include command detonated Claymore munitions. (Leahy 
Amendment, signed into law February 12, 1996, "Moratorium on Use of Antipersonnel 
Landmines," section 583)  
AP Mine Sifter A drum that picks up the contaminated soil, closes and rotates until all loose soil falls out. The remaining debris can be visually inspected. 
ARIS network A European Network of Excellence on “Action for Research and Information Support in Civilian Demining”, co-ordinated by JRC 
Biochemical 
Neutralization 
Some organisms feed on certain elements of explosive chemicals, thus rendering them inert, 
and therefore could theoretically be used in demining. 
Biosensor 
Animals (dogs, pigs, rats) can be used as biosensors but the term can also refer to other new 
artificial vapour-analysing technologies such as artificial olfactory systems which analyse air 
particles for trace elements of explosive vapours. 
Bounding Mine 
A fragmentation anti-personnel mine that employs a primary charge to elevate the mine to a 
predetermined height before the main charge is initiated. Set off by either trip wire or pressure 
and, unlike blast and simple fragmentation mines, is designed to kill rather than maim. 
Sometimes nicknamed "bouncing Betty." 
Check Clearing 
When little or nothing is known about the mine situation in a given area, the area has to be 
check-cleared to establish whether it is mined and warrants a full fledged mine clearing 
operation. 
Clutter Interfering echo's in a radar signal caused by reflection from objects other than the target 
Command-
destructing Mine A mine that can be detonated by a remotely delivered command. 
Countermine 
Military operations concerned primarily with rapid breaching of mined barriers rather than 
mine clearing through the use of ploughs, rollers, flails, etc., and not concerned with area 
clearance. 
Demining The complete removal of all landmines from an area in order to safeguard the civilian population. (Hidden Killers, 1994) 
Demining Debt Used to describe the phenomena occurring when the uncleared landmines proliferate at a rate faster than adequate funds and technologies allow for as a rate of clearance. 
DoD Department of Defence 
Earth Tiller Horizontal steel beam mounted with teeth tilling the soil up to a depth up to 50 cm, whilst travelling, detonating or disrupting mines 
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Electromagnetic 
Induction (EMI) 
The process by which a current flowing through a primary coil produces a secondary current 
in a conductive medium 
Environmental 
Restoration 
The process of cleaning up areas that have experienced military action or armed conflict 
eliminating munitions, explosives, and harmful by-products to restore the area to peaceful 
civilian pursuits. 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
False Alarm Rate The rate of alarms generated by other phenomena than the target objects which have to be detected  
Flail 
Rotary flail devices are typically composed of cylindrical drum structures housing a collection 
of chains on a horizontal bar which, hitting and milling the ground to detonate the mines or 
break  them apart 
FNA 
Fast Neutron Analysis is based on the interaction of fast neutrons with the nuclei of interest. 
During this process the high energy neutrons put elements in an excited, short lived state, in 
particular Carbon, Nitrogen and Oxygen of explosives and soils, by hitting their nuclei. The 
nuclei return to their initial state by emitting gamma radiation, whose energy distribution is 
chemically characteristic of each nucleus. By characterising the outgoing gamma rays it is 
possible to calculate the elemental proportions – how much of each element (C, N, O) is 
present with respect to the others – in order to determine the type of substance under analysis 
Fragmentation 
Mine 
An antipersonnel mine laying above the ground and usually employing either a packing of 
fragments, steel balls, or pellets, or a segmented outer casing which is dispersed by the force 
of the explosion and becomes the primary cause of injury to the victim. 
GIS Geographic Information System 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GPR Ground Penetrating Radar 
Horizontal Action 
Mine 
Mine designed to produce a destructive effect to one or more targets in a variable direction 
approximately parallel to the ground. Also called an aim controlled-effect mine (ACEM). 
Humanitarian 
Demining 
The safe, effective, and cost efficient clearance of landmines from land and littoral areas in 
order that life can return to normal. 
IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometer 
Indiscriminate 
Effect 
Problems posed by landmines even when the combatants make a good faith effort to 
distinguish between military targets and civilians; because of the inherent time lag between 
the laying of mines and their explosion, mines often present an indiscriminate danger far into 
the future. 
Infrared (IR) 
technology 
Technology based on electromagnetic waves in the infrared spectral region, lying outside the 
visible spectrum at its red end 
International 
Organisations (IOs) 
Organisations with a global charter and influence such as the United Nations and International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
JRC Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
JUXOCO Joint Unexploded Co-ordination Office, the US government office responsible for all army counter mine programmes, including humanitarian demining programmes 
Landmine Any munitions designed and manufactured to be detonated after it has been laid by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. (Hidden Killers, 1994)  
LWIR Long Wave IR (8-12µm) 
MD Detector to detect metallic objects 
Mine Action In principle, includes more than mine clearing and mine awareness campaigns and is designed to mitigate the effects of landmines prior to the beginning of clearance operations. 
Mine Action Center 
(MAC) 
A host nation structure for carrying out mine awareness campaigns, conduct reconnaissance, 
collects and centralizes mine data 
Mine Awareness 
Training 
A program to assist host nation governments, international organisations, and non-
governmental organisations to train local populations to deal with landmines until mines can 
be permanently removed. The program minimises the danger of uncleared mines by training 
host nationals in mine detection, identification, marking, avoidance, reporting, mapping, 
rudimentary extrication, and first aid skills. 
Minefield Density The average number of landmines detected per square meter of minefield or the number of mines in a known "pattern." 
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Mine Protected 
Vehicle (MPV) Vehicles designed to be protected against AP and AT mines. 
Microwave A comparatively short electromagnetic wave, typical wave lengths between 1 cm-1 m 
Millimeter wave Frequency between 50-180 GHz, i.e. wavelength between 6 mm-1.7 mm respectively 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
Multi-sensor Mine 
Detector 
Detection using combinations of technologies such as magnetic, infrared, microwave, 
chemical, radar and biosensor detectors to correlate their respective accuracy's into a more 
accurate detection. 
MWIR Medium Wave IR (3-5µm) 
Non-governmental 
Organisations 
(NGOs) 
Transnational organisation of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Non-governmental organisations may be 
professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a 
common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). 
Non-reconstitutable 
Mine 
A self-deactivating, self-neutralising, or command-neutralising mine that cannot be 
reactivated by means available outside its manufacturing plant or comparable facility. 
NMR Nuclear Magnetic Resonance: the magnetic resonance of an atomic nucleus  
NQR 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance: an electromagnetic resonance screening technique for the 
detection of explosives in bulk form, relying upon the resonant response of certain nuclei 
possessing electric quadrupole moments 
PETN 
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (C5H8N4O12) is one of the strongest known high explosives. It is 
primarily used in booster and bursting charges of small calibre ammunition, and in upper 
charges of detonators in some landmines and shells. 
Probing See prodding 
Prodding Location of individual mines by prodding the ground with a thin rod or blade inserted at an angle every 4-5 cm (i.e., 400-600 prodding actions every square meter). 
RDX 
(Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine, C3H6N6O6) Hexogen, or Cyclonite, RDX is considered one of 
the most powerful military high explosives. Sometimes used in mines together with TNT 
(Composition-B). 
R&D Research & Development 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristics 
Safety Distance Distance to be maintained at all times between deminers; usually 50 meters between teams and 5 meters between members of the same team. 
Self-deactivating 
Mine 
A mine that automatically renders itself inoperable by means of exhaustion of a component of 
the mine that is essential to the operation of the mine. 
Self-destructing 
Mine A mine that automatically destroys itself by means of an incorporated mechanism. 
Self-eliminating 
Mine A mine that is self-destructing, self-deactivating, and cannot be reconstructed.. 
Self-neutralizing 
Mine A mine that automatically renders itself inoperable by means of an incorporated mechanism. 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SER Statements of Equipment Requirements 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SOR Statements of Operational Requirements  
Sub-Surface 
Clearance 
Mine clearance is categorised by depth; in this case, the ground has to be searched for mines 
to a depth of 200mm, the layer where antipersonnel mines are found. 
TNA  
Thermal Neutron Analysis: features high sensitivity to nitrogen concentration and low cost. 
On the other hand it is relatively slow, and is usually not employed in a real-time mode, like 
conventional metal detector for example, but used as a confirmatory device targeted at the 
verification of suspected spots. 
TNT (2,4,6-) Trinitrotoluene (also Trotyl), most common explosive in landmines (C7H5N3O6) 
UWB Ultra-wideband radar 
Unexploded 
Ordnance (UXO) Any mass-produced explosive munitions that have failed to function fully as designed. 
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Vegetation Cutter Machine designed for clearing vegetation and tripwires as a precursor to accelerated manual clearance 
Wheel Shovel 
Wheel Shovel (e.g. HALO Trust in Afghanistan) based systems for digging up mines that will 
be manually cleared afterwards, for the excavation and inspection of (urban) rubble, also for 
roads (road grader). A mesh basket is fitted over the shovel, which then shakes out the rubble; 
large ordnance and mines will remain held by the mesh in the bucket. 
X-ray back scatter The scattering of X-ray radiation in a direction opposite to that of the incident radiation, due to reflection on particles of the medium traversed. 
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ANNEX 1. EXISTING INFORMATION SOURCES AND DATABASES 
EXPLOITED AS “STARTING POINTS” 
 
 Internet: list of links and databases: 
 DeTeC (http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/minelinks.html); 
 MgM Foundation Web site (http://www.mgm.org/); 
 Lawrence Livermore National Lab’s “Who’s Who” 
(http://www.llnl.gov/landmine/landmine_whos_who.html); 
 HDIC Demining Organisation Directory 
(http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/exchange/database/); 
 CARE (http://www.care.org/newscenter/landmines/ngoland.html); 
 JMU Humanitarian Demining Information Center 
(http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/exchange/ngo/). 
 
 Internal lists of persons and organisations active in humanitarian demining, accumulated in previous 
projects, and other lists: 
 Internal EPFL; 
 Internal VUB (also in relation with ongoing projects); 
 US State Department “Hidden Killer’98” report 
(http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_toc.html) 
 
 EU financed projects, in the research as well as the clearance area: 
 List of projects and contact points: projects from DGIII(ESPRIT)/DGXIII: 
http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/hphdhome.htm 
 For technology projects from DGVIII, Mr. Cervone / DGVIII; 
 ARIS Network of Excellence (NoE) on Humanitarian Demining (http://www.at.sai.jrc.it/aris/); 
 DGIA, DGIB - Mr. Cervone; 
 DGVIII: airborne minefield detection. 
 
 List of participants to well known conferences in the domain: 
 JRC workshops; 
 Edinburgh 96-98 (EUREL International Conference on The Detection of Abandoned Landmines); 
 Other (ex. conferences on mechanical demining in Germany & Toulouse). 
 
 Literature on the subject (survey papers for example). 
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ANNEX 2. LIST OF RECEIVED DOCUMENTS, PUBLICITY BROCHURES, AND 
OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES 
 
(1) Andrews A.M., George V., Altshuler T.W. & Mulqueen M. Results of the Countermine Task Force Mine 
Detection Technology Demonstration at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, March 18-22, 1996 
(2) Rotondo F., Altshuler T.W., Rosen E., Dion-Schwarz C & Ayers E. Report on the Advanced Technology 
Demonstration (ATD) of the Vehicular Mounted Mine Detection (VMMD) Systems at Aberdeen, 
Maryland, and Socorro, New Mexico, Virginia, 1998 
(3) JUXOCO (Joint Unexploded Ordnance Coordination Office). Hand Held Metallic Mine Detector 
Performance Baselining Collection Plan, Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, 1998 
(4) Tantum S.L. & Collins L.M. Detection and identification of mines using signals from Wichmann/BRTRC 
Antenna: a preliminary report, Duke University. 
(5) Carin L. & Baum C.E. Wideband Time- and Frequency-Domain EMI: Phenomenology and Signal 
Processing, Duke University 
(6) Khadr N., Barrow B.J., Bell T.H. & Nelson H.H. Target Shape Classification using Electromagnetic 
Induction Sensor Data, Arlington. 
(7) Kaczkowski P.J. Pulsed Electromagnetic Induction (PEMI) for UXO Discrimination in JPG Phase IV – 
Preliminary Results, University of Washington. 
(8) Arcone S.A., Delaney A.J., Sellmann P.V. & O'Neill K. UXO detection at Jefferson Proving Ground Using 
Ground-Penetrating Radar, UXO Forum '98, Anaheim, California, 1998 
(9) Wichmann G. Research and Development on the Field of Mine Detection, 1996 
(10) DFID Background Briefing. Humanitarian mine action, a progress report, February 1999 
(11)  Andrews A.M., Altshuler T.W., Rosen E.M. & Porter L.J. Performance in December 1996 Hand-Held 
Landmine Detection Tests at APG, Coleman Research Corp. (CRC), GDE Systems, Inc. (GDE), and 
AN/PSS-12, IDA, March 1996 
(12)  Carin L., Geng N. & McClure M. Ultra-Wideband Synthetic Aperture Radar for Mine Field Detection, 
Duke University, Durham 
(13)  Arnsfelt A.B., PL Brake. Innovative environmental inventions. 
(14)  Hydrema Publicity Brochure on Mine Clearing Vehicles 
(15)  Vallon Publicity Brochure on MDs 
(16)  CAT Publicity Brochure on Multisensor Mine Detecting System 
(17)  Zanzi L, Moscon A & Valle S. Processing Strategies for the Application of the GPR Technology to 
Humanitarian Demining, Milano, Italy 
(18)  DEMEX Publicity Brochure on Environment Dynamics Recovery 
(19)  Naz P., Bobin L., Christnacher F & Parmentier G. Détection acoustique et sismique d'objets enfouis, ISL 
(20)  SODERN Publicity Brochure on Neutronics 
(21)  Universität Tübingen Publicity Brochure 
(22)  IUT Publicity Brochure on Ion Mobility Spectrometry 
(23)  FGAN Publicity Brochure on Research Fields and organisation 
(24)  TZN Publicity Brochure on Mobile Mine Detection and Clearance Device 
(25)  ABC Publicity Brochure 
(26)  LETI Publicity Brochure on Magnometer Technologies 
(27)  CEA-LETI Publicity Brochure on X-Technologies 
(28)  Cacciabue P.C. (ed.). Human Factors Research Activities, Annual Report 1998, JRC, Ispra, 1998 
(29)  SATIMO Publicity Brochure on Electromagnetic Field Measurement Systems 
(30)  AA Publicity Brochure on Leben Ohne Minen: Der Ottawa Vertrag- Eine Herausförderung für die Zukunft. 
(31)  AA Report on Humanitarian Mine Action, 1998 
(32)  Busch OTL. Humanitäres Minenräumen in Afghanistan, Bonn, June 1999 
(33)  Padova University Publicity Brochure on the Explodet Project 1998 Progress Report 
(34)  Bach P, Le Tourneur P., Poumarède B & Brette M. Detection of Abandoned Land Mines Using Neutron 
Interrogation. International Conference Edinburgh, UK 1996. 
(35)  Bach P., Ma J.L, Froment D. a J.C. Jaureguy. Chemical Weapons detection by fast neutron activation 
analysis techniques. 
(36)  Vettèse F., Asselineau B, Dhermain J, Antonot B & Bach P. Neutron activation analysis techniques to 
identify arsenic in chemical weapons, Sweden, June 1995. 
(37)  SODERN Publicity Brochure on Mines detector using neutron interrogation 
(38)  General Engineering Anchor Group Publicity Brochure on GIS for demining 
(39)  ABC Publicity Brochure on Humanitarian Demining 
(40)  BICAT Publicity Brochure on Recycling of Demolition Debris with Hidden Explosives 
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(41)  Aardvark Publicity Brochure on Mechanical Minefield Clearance System 
(42)  Hydrema Publicity Brochure on Mine Clearing Vehicle 
(43)  Handicap International-MAG-NPA. Publicity Brochure "Portfolio of Mine Related Projects 1998 
(44)  Busch OTL Slides on Close-in Detection & Remote Sensing System 
(45)  AA Humanitarian Mine Action Equipment Catalogue 1998-1999 
(46)  NPA Brochure: Mines, the Silent Killers 
(47)  Hundskolan Publicity Brochure 
(48)  Hundskolan Video 
(49)  Celsius Mine-Guzzler Video 
(50)  Celsius Publicity Brochure on Mine Guzzler & Technical Description 
(51)  Ixtrem Publicity Brochure on Electromagnetic Detectors 
(52)  DLR print out CD-rom 
(53)  TNO year report 1998 
(54)  Vallon Publicity Brochure on Metal Mine Detectors 
(55)  Aardvark Beating the land mine video 
(56)  Hydrema Publicity Brochure on Toolbox Concept 
(57)  AA slides on Toolbox approach 
(58)  ICRC Overview 1998 
(59)  Schiebel Publicity Brochure on All Terrain Mine Detector 
(60)  HOM2000 Publicity Brochure 
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ANNEX 3. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SURVEY 
 
Questionnaire for a survey: EU-project on DEMINING organisations 
 
 
PART I: Identification Data (required unless otherwise specified) 
Organisation Name: «Institute» - «Dept» 
 
Organisation Type (please cross out and/or complete): 
 
 Industrial SME (<250 pers.) 
 Large Industry 
 Research Centre 
 Academia 
 Defence 
 Other Governmental 
 NGO 
 International Organisation 
 Other, please specify: …………………………………….. 
 
Contact Person, «Title» «First_name» «Family_Name»,  
Function within Organisation: ……………………………… 
 
Address (Street, no., Postal Code, City, Country): 
«Address_1» 
«Address_2» 
«city» 
«Country» 
 
Telephone/Fax no.    T«Tel»                                                     F: «Fax». 
E-mail (if available): «Email» 
Address of the Web site(s) (if available): «Homepage» 
 
Affiliation or Branches in other Countries (if applicable) to be listed below: 
 
 
 
Total no. of Staff Members working in the entire Organisation: 
 
No. of Staff Members in activities directly related with Demining: 
 
Involvement in Demining (please cross out and/or complete): 
 Mine Awareness 
 Victim Assistance  
 Survey/Mapping 
 Detection 
 Clearance/Destruction 
 Other, please specify:…………………………………. 
 
Type of Involvement (please cross out and/or complete): 
 Consultancy 
 Education/Training 
 Equipment Manufacturing 
 Demining Campaigner/Organiser 
 Other, please specify:…………………………………. 
 
 
PART II: Structural data on the organisation type: 
Products/services/research topics (if any) offered/handled by your organisation: 
 
 
 
Please list five keywords to summarise your activities: 
- ……………………………..              -……………………………..              - ……………………………… 
 
- ……………………………..              -…………………………….. 
 
Current activities, described in an abstract of not more than 10 lines: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial support sources (if any) actually involved in these activities:  
 
 
 
 
Specific technologies currently being used or considered for the future: 
 
 
 
Solutions which have been used in the past, but have been discarded, and why: 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III: Background data on the organisations’ partners and more specific information: 
Partners (if any) involved in current (C) or past (P) activities: 
 
 
 
 
Comments (C) or needs (N) that you would like to share with us: 
 
 
 
 
Please list references* on your activities (articles, brochures, books with results, activity reports, yearbooks, …) which you judge 
to be relevant: 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you interested/willing to have further contacts and/or visits?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
*Please send us a copy of your reference material together with the completed questionnaire or 
by separate mail to the following address:  
Karin De Bruyn 
EUDEM Survey Project-Vrije Universiteit Brussels 
ETRO Dept., Fac. of Applied Sciences 
Pleinlaan 2 
B-1050 Brussels, BELGIUM 
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ANNEX 4. CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT 
During EUDEM 49 main players, active in several aspects of demining/mine action, were personally visited in 
10 European countries. The following visits and interviews were carried out in chronological order:  
Organisation Full Name Place Country Date 
IDS Ingegneria dei Sistemi  Pisa Italy 14/1/1999 
JRC EC Joint Research Centre Ispra, Varese Italy 15/2/1999 
Politecnico di Milano   Milano Italy 16/2/1999 
INFN Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare  Padova Italy 16/2/1999 
ABC Appalti Bonifiche Costruzioni  Firenze Italy 17/2/1999 
Marconi SpA (now Marconi Communications) Genova Italy 18/2/1999 
ICRC Intnl. Committee of the Red Cross Genève Switzerland 3/3/1999 
GICHD Geneva Intl Centre for Hum. Demining Bern & Genève Switzerland 15/3&3/6/1999 
Alain Priou  contribution by e-mail Univ. X Nanterre, Paris France 18/3/1999 
DGA Délégation Générale pour l’Armement  St. Cloud, Paris France 23/3/1999 
Handicap International  Lyon France 23/3/1999 
ONERA   Toulouse France 24/3/1999 
SATIMO  Courtabœuf, Paris France 24/3/1999 
ISL Institut de Saint-Louis  Saint-Louis France 24/3/1999 
CEA-LETI   Grenoble France 25/3/1999 
EPPRA  Palaiseau, Paris France 26/3/1999 
SODERN  Limeil-Brevannes, Paris France 26/3/1999 
MoD UK Ministry of Defence  London United Kingdom 30/3/1999 
DERA Defence Research & Evaluation 
Agency 
 Chertsey United Kingdom 30/3/1999 
HALO Trust   Glasgow United Kingdom 31/3/1999 
BGT Bodenseewerk Gerätetechnick  Ueberlingen Germany 21/4/1999 
Vallon GmbH   Eningen Germany 22/4/1999 
Universität Tübingen  Tübingen Germany 22/4/1999 
Institut Dr. Förster  Reutlingen Germany 23/4/1999 
FGAN/FOM Research Establishment 
for Applied Science 
Tübingen Germany 23/4/1999 
TZN  Unterlüss Germany 3/5/1999 
IUT Institut für Umwelttechnologien Berlin Germany 4/5/1999 
DEMEX (Consulting Engineers) Copenhagen Denmark 5/5/1999 
A/S Hydrema  Støvring, Aalborg Denmark 5/5/1999 
DTU Technical University of Denmark  Lyngby Denmark 6/5/1999 
Ole Nymann, CAT  (Lyngby, see above) Denmark 6/5/1999 
FOA Swedish Defence Research Est. Linköping Sweden 10/5/1999 
Biosensor Applications AB  Oerebro Sweden 11/5/1999 
Bofors AB  Karlskoga Sweden 11/5/1999 
Celsius Tech  Järfälla, Stockholm Sweden 12/5/1999 
Landmacht Dutch Ministry of Defence  Den Haag The Netherlands 18/5/1999 
TNO Netherlands Organisation for 
Applied Scientific Research 
 Den Haag The Netherlands 18/5/1999 
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid  Oslo Norway 20/5/1999 
Swedish Armed Forces  
Dog Training Center 
  Stockholm Sweden 20/5/1999 
Humanity Dog   Kramfors Sweden 21/5/1999 
UN MAAP and CROMAC UN Mine Action Assistance 
Programme, CROatian MAC 
Zagreb Croatia 24/5/1999 
MECHEM operations   Gospic, Licki Osik Croatia 25/5-26/5/1999 
A.B.C.D. operations   Slavonski Brod Croatia 27/5/1999 
Tamar operations area [ops had not yet started] Kusonje Croatia 27/5/1999 
CROMAC Scientif Council  Zagreb Croatia 28/5/1999 
King’s College London [written contribution]  London United Kingdom 5/1999 
JRC EC Joint Research Centre  Ispra, Varese Italy 14/6-16/6/1999 
German Federal Foreign Office   Bonn Germany 25/6/1999 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt 
 München Germany 25/6/1999 
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ANNEX 5. THE CASE-STUDY DONE IN THE US 
The study was carried out by John Brooks, on behalf of the EUDEM project. 
 
1. Introduction. 
This report summarizes the results of a series of telephone and personal contacts made with US Government and 
industry representative in various areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and land mine detection and 
remediation. Table 4 at the end of this report lists the names and affiliations of all key personnel contacted. The 
goals of the survey were to determine the current state-of-the-art of US military and humanitarian demining 
technologies related to the detection and classification of anti-personnel land mines (APLs). US Army-funded 
programs were investigated; the many US Navy programs were not, due to the general nature of humanitarian or 
post-conflict demining.  All information herein is current as of 01 March 1999. 
 
1.1. Approach 
The approach to the survey was two-fold; telephone contact and personal contact. Every effort was made to 
contact the program manager for each on-going technology development effort. In general, they were responsive 
to my inquiries, but declined to provide specifics of any signal processing. In almost all cases, they referred me 
to the Government Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) at Ft. Belvoir.  
 
Upon contacting each individual, I explained my relationship to the EUDEM; in addition, I informed each 
individual that all information provided by them could be used in published documents; thus, any proprietary or 
confidential information was to be excluded.  However, within this report, I have at times made judgements of 
sensor configurations and performance based on deriving or extrapolating from personal observations of 
equipment.  This is particularly the case with the GDE version of the HSTAMIDS, where I have made inferences 
of system configuration based on personally handling the device, and discussions with US Government 
personnel. 
 
On 24 and 25 February 1999, I met with representatives of the US Night Vision Electronic Sensors Directorate 
(NVESD) and the Joint Unexploded Ordnance Coordination Office (JUXOCO). NVESD is the designated US 
Government office of responsibility for all Army countermine programs, including humanitarian demining 
programs.  JUXOCO was established to provide a coordination function for all Department of Defense (DoD) 
UXO programs; it serves as a repository of data collected at US test facilities such as Ft. A.P. Hill, Aberdeen 
Proving Ground and the Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG).  All test data involving UXO and mine 
detection/clearance is linked to the JUXOCO web site, http://www.uxocoe.org/index2.htm. JUXOCO is also 
referred to as the Joint UXO Center of Excellence, abbreviated JUXOCOE.  In this report, JUXOCO, UXOCOE, 
UXOCO and JUXOCOE may be used interchangeably. 
 
1.2. Previous Surveys and Workshops 
JUXOCOE held a series of workshops to investigate various technical approaches to detecting UXO. Due to the 
volume of information, the links to those workshops are provided. 
 
General:  http://www.uxocoe.org/index2.htm  
Aided Target Recognition: 
http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/UXOCOE/Documents/Atr/atr1.html#Technology%20Limitations 
Other Technologies: http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/UXOCOE/Documents/Other/other1.html 
Magnetometry: http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/UXOCOE/Documents/Magnetometry/mag2.html 
 
1.3. Comments on Military vs. Humanitarian Design 
Because the vast majority of funding for US demining technology is derived from the US Department of Defense 
(DoD), it is therefore necessary to understand the extent to which the design of such systems is based on military 
operational doctrine compared to humanitarian, or post-conflict doctrine. This influence is manifested in two 
ways; the requirement, stated by US Government program managers, to locate the mine "in real time" and also 
the fact that all developmental devices are tested by military engineers using military practices. The first 
requirement results in a development path that does not permit the exploitation of several processing methods 
which, for example, generate an image of the target following the scanning of an area of interest. The current 
prototype models (CRC, GDE) Hand-Held STAnd-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) are scanned over 
an area of interest and the possible presence of a mine is indicated by a simple audio tone at the time the sensor is 
passed over the mine; thus, only the received energy and possibly the duration (an indication of physical size of 
the target) are used as classification features. The practice of military personnel testing the devices leads to 
designs which may not be ergonomically suited to indigenous deminers in such places as Cambodia and Angola; 
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acceptance of the devices by those deminers and the corresponding Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is 
thus problematical. 
 
1.4. Comments on Performance Measures 
As a framework for the discussion in the following sections, it is instructive to assess the way in which field tests 
in the US have been conducted and evaluated.  In particular, whether a contractor "wins" or "loses" a competition 
is based almost entirely on how that contractor scores in the area of "probability of detection (Pd)" and 
"probability of false alarm (Pfa)" and the resulting receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. Three specific 
reports are of note (Andrews, et.al.(1), Rotonso, et. al.(2), Draft JUXOCO Report (3)). Each report has different 
criteria for measuring Pd and Pfa, so it is not possible to compare various systems from one report to the other, 
nor is there any firm "standard" measure of performance. 
 
The first report describes a series of tests conducted in March 1996 of both vehicular and hand-held demining 
systems. The vehicular systems were represented by Geo-Centers, SAIC, IAI Elta and GDE Systems.  In this 
report, a valid target is declared if it is detected anywhere within the bounds of the mine, and also 0.5 m outside 
the mine boundary; in other words, the mine is surrounded by a "halo" which is 0.5 m larger than the mine itself 
(Hand-held systems were evaluated with a 0.15m halo): 
 
 
Thus, any signal that exceeds some threshold within this large ring is considered to be a valid mine detection.  
Additional detections within the halo are considered to be redundant. The second report describes a series of tests 
conducted at Aberdeen and Soccoro sites two years later than the first report.  The systems in this report are from 
CRC, GDE, EG&G, GeoCenters and Computing Devices of Canada. In the second report, the halo is extended to 
1.0m. This automatically increases the chance that a "detection" will be declared a mine (and thus ensuring a 
higher "score" for the device,) even though it may have been produced by a non-mine object.  
 
In both the above reports, the ROC is generated by assuming Gaussian statistics for both clutter and mean-shifted 
Gaussian for target + clutter. This seems to imply that the mean clutter is statistically different from the target; 
this is not the case in practice. Perhaps a better measure of performance under the Gaussian assumption would be 
a test of variance, or an assumption of Rayleigh-Rice statistics common to radar signal processing practice. 
 
The third report is a draft test plan for the HSTAMIDS tests.  In this report, the test area of size 49m x 20m is 
divided into 980 squares, each 1 m in length.  880 squares contain various clutter targets, and 100 squares contain 
mine targets.  The center of each grid square is scanned once vertically and once horizontally as shown in the 
following figure, extracted from the test plan: 
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This methodology permits a more consistent measure of assessing detector performance. It should be noted, 
however, that this test approach still involves the use of a single scan in any one direction over the target. No 
images are created. The results of this test methodology was used by Duke University to assert "100% Correct" 
classification of a number of minimum-metal APLs with the Wichmann/BRTRC antenna (4). 
 
The above discussion points out the need to develop a consistent method, and a mathematically sound procedure 
for assessing and comparing system performance; it also indicates that reports of a certain system achieving a 
specific level for Pd and Pfa needs to be accompanied with a clear explanation of the methods used to determine 
the reported performance. 
 
1.5. Summary of Technology Issues 
 
RADAR (GPR) 
For this survey, three US GPR programs were reviewed; the Ground-based STAnd-off Mine Detection System 
(GSTAMIDS), the Hand-held STAnd-off  Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS), and a developmental short-
pulse hand-held GPR designated as the BRTRC/Wichmann radar. In general, the tendency to employ stepped-
frequency modulation is consistent between the three main programs; the BRTRC/Wichmann radar uses a more 
conventional short-pulse modulation, albeit a very wideband pulse, ca. 5 GHz. 
 
Although no specific information was obtained regarding signal processing methods and algorithms due to 
company proprietary considerations, a review of applicable published literature and discussions with US 
Government personnel revealed that, in general, the features used for classification are rather simple, including 
the statistical mean and variance of the returned signals under the assumption of a Gaussian distribution for 
noise.  This may explain the poor performance of the HSTAMIDS candidates to date.  The US requirement for 
HSTAMIDS is a probability of detection, Pd, of a mine to be 0.80 (see Section 1.1); the "halo" for handheld 
system tests is 15cm); the best performance with trained contractor personnel was 0.70, and the average 
performance using military personnel was only 0.30 for min-metal APL. Such performance has led to an 18-
month extension of the HSTAMIDS program. 
 
ELECTROMAGNETIC INDUCTION (EMI) 
EMI has been used with some success for the detection of buried metallic UXO and mines (5) One EMI system 
which has been used in these tests is the Geophex GEM-3 (8).  The GEM-3 is a prototype wide-band frequency-
domain EMI sensor. The GEM-3 uses a pair of concentric, circular coils to transmit a continuous, wideband, 
digital electromagnetic waveform.  The resulting field induces a secondary current in the earth as well as in any 
buried objects. The set of two transmitter coils has been designed so that they create a zone of magnetic cavity at 
the center of the two coils.  A third receiving coil is placed within the magnetic cavity so that it senses only the 
weak secondary field returned from the earth and buried objects.   
 
INFRARED (IR) 
The Airborne STAnd-off Mine Detection System (ASTAMIDS) was a program developed to locate minefields, 
and used an IR sensor as the primary queuing sensor. ASTAMIDS failed to meet US Government specifications 
due to the poor performance of the IR sensor.  He program has been realigned to study other options; the 
program is now called the Light Airborne Mine Detector (LAMD), according to NVESD and JUXOCOE 
personnel.  No specific information regarding the failure has been made available at the time of this report. 
 
2. Vendor Specifics 
 
2.1. HSTAMIDS 
The Government Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) is Mr. Mark Locke, 703-704-2418, 
mlocke@nvl.army.mil. 
 
The HSTAMIDS program consists of working prototypes from Coleman Research Corp. (CRC) and GDE 
Systems.  When controlled tests were conducted at Yuma Proving Ground, both "expert operators" (contractor 
personnel) and military operators used the systems.  The expert operators managed to achieve a probability of 
detection (Pd) of about 0.70, whereas the military operators achieved only about 0.30 Pd. The objective goal for 
HSTAMIDS is to achieve a Pd of 0.80, so the HSTAMIDS program has been extended for 18 months, with 
additional tests to be conducted in march-April 2000. 
 
A detailed  summary of additional tests of the two HSTAMIDS competitors in Dec. 96 is attached (9), and is also 
available at http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/UXOCOE/Documents/Ida/ida1.html.  
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The following, extracted from the report, summarizes the performance of the two systems: 
 
"The two contractor systems exhibited similar performance to the AN/PSS-12 for AT/Metal, AP/Metal, and 
AP/LowMetal. For AT/LowMetal and AT/NonMetal, both systems outperformed the AN/PSS-12. Finally, the 
CRC system exhibited a slight statistically significant improvement over the AN/PSS-12 for AP/NM, whereas 
the GDE system did not exhibit a statistically significant increase in performance, as determined from the upper 
limits on the confidence intervals calculated using a binomial detection process. The following summarizes the 
results: 
 
 GDE CRC AN/PSS-12 
Mine Type FAR 
(m-2) 
Pd  SNR FAR 
(m-2) 
Pd  SNR FAR 
(m-2) 
Pd  SNR 
AT/M 0.50 0.97 8.3 0.67 1.00  0.56 1.00  
AP/M 0.50 0.97 9.2 0.67 0.93 7.9 0.56 0.97 9.1 
AT/LM 0.50 0.90 6.7 0.67 0.97 7.9 0.56 0.67 3.5 
AP/LM 0.50 0.66 5.1 0.67 0.69 4.9 0.56 0.67 5.0 
AT/NM 0.50 0.91 6.9 0.67 0.89 6.1 0.56 0.34 -1.7 
AP/NM 0.50 0.32 1.1 0.67 0.46 2.4 0.56 0.20 -1.9 
 
•= "Both the GDE and CRC systems provide increased capability over the AN/PSS-12. This is particularly 
true with regard to the detection of AT/LM, AT/NM, and potentially for AP/NM mines. Regardless of 
the improved performance of the contractor systems relative to the AN/PSS-12, both performed poorly 
when attempting to detect AP/LM and very poorly when attempting to detect AP/NM mines. (emphasis 
added by JWB) 
 
•= "Detection of NM mines by the AN/PSS-12 -- which does not have the capability to detect nonmetallic 
objects -- indicates that visual cues may have influenced the test results. 
 
•= "Probabilities of detection in the current test are somewhat lower than have been achieved by the same 
systems in previous tests. This may be attributable to operation of the equipment by soldiers rather than 
contractor personnel; it may also be due to differing clutter environments, target populations, and 
natural geology. " 
 
Neither of the HSTAMIDS devices produce any type of image.  In operation, the sensor is scanned by hand and 
an audio and visual indication alert the operator to the presence of an anomaly; the radar sensors can be 
considered to be adjuncts to the MD sensor in both cases. 
 
GDE:  
Program Manager : Mr. Bob Penninger, 619-675-2605 
 
Mr. Penninger declined to provide any details of the GDE version of HSTAMIDS, other than to volunteer that 
the modulation scheme is a stepped frequency approach.  NVESD has a working prototype of the GDE 
HSTAMIDS; a physical inspection of the GDE device reveals that the antenna assembly is probably of a patch 
design.  There are two painted rings on the top of the antenna assembly, and an oval-shaped drawing; each figure 
is offset to denote the locations of the metal detector loop, a wide-band RF antenna and possibly a narrow-band, 
high-frequency RF antenna.   According to NVESD personnel, the fact that the three sensors are not coaxial, the 
possible detection of a target can lead to confusion in target registration. The higher frequency antenna is 
probably designed to permit better discrimination of small targets. The hand-held sensor is augmented with a 
helmet-mounted IR camera, as is the CRC model.   
 
CRC:  
Program Manager: Dr. Bill Steinway, Bill_Steinway@mail.crc.com 
 
The CRC version of HSTAMIDS is a stepped-frequency GPR operating (according to contractor-provided 
information) in 128 discrete frequencies from ca. 900 MHz to ca. 2750 MHz; a single scan through these 
frequencies is called a "frequency packet" and 78 packets are transmitted per second. Thus, each frequency dwell 
has a nominal 100 microsecond duration, with a nominal 14 MHz frequency separation. The current version has 
2 receive and 2 transmit antennas; however, the newest version for evaluation will have a single transmit antenna 
and 2 receive antennas. 
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2.2. GSTAMIDS: 
GSTAMIDS is now undergoing proposal evaluation for EMD (PE 6.4) so all discussions about the current 
program are prohibited until after 01 April 1999. Government Contracting Officer Technical Representative 
(COTR) for preceding program is Peter Howard, 703-704-2636, phoward@invel.army.mil. Test reports on 
previous GSTAMIDS devices are referenced in (6) and (7), and the following comments are derived from those 
reports. 
Although not explicitly a part of the GSTAMIDS program, the Boom-SAR (10) has been used to outline 
minefields. The reference indicates reasonably good agreement between simulation and experiment. 
 
EG&G:  
POC: Jory Cafferky, 505-998-0677, caffej@egginc.com, http://www.eoir.com/uxo/eg&g.htm 
 
The August 1997 EG&G data collection was performed to test the ability of the EG&G VMMD Radar System to 
locate buried mines. The EG&G radar system is comprised of nine transmitter/receiver pairs each 35cm apart, 1 
foot off the ground, and pointed at a 45 degree angle with respect to the ground.  
 
GEO-CENTERS, INC.  
POC: Thomas Gorman, 617-964-7070, tomgorman@tech.geo-centers.com,  
 
Geo-Centers GSTAMIDS consists of a  vehicle-mounted GPR and IR sensors. The forward looking IR sensor 
consists of a 3-5 mm Amberview camera that provides a 14 bit, 256 by 256 pixel, video image every 2 seconds. 
The GPR system is mounted 50 cm. above the ground. The 80 cm. wide multi-antenna (four transmit, four 
receive) ground-penetrating radar array, termed a Focused Array Radar (FAR), focuses and sweeps energy into 
the ground to detect buried objects. This GPR operates in a frequency range of 700-1,300 MHz. The focused 
GPR array is described at http://www-dsed.llnl.gov/documents/em/sdndarpa96/sdndarpa96.html, "LLNL 
DARPA Mine Detection Field Experiment using RF." 
 
2.3. BRTRC/Wichmann  
 
Fred Clodfelter, 703-205-1535, fclodfel@brtrc.com, http://www.brtrc.com/:, described briefly a cooperative 
agreement between BRTRC and Guenter Wichmann whereas BRTRC builds a GPR using the Wichmann 
antenna. The antenna is claimed to minimize ground clutter and is the key component; the antenna has an upper 
frequency of ca. 5 GHz. And employs a simple pulse.  
 
Subsequent to the visit to JUXOCO, a report dated 1996, entitled "Research and Development on the Field of 
Mine Detection" by Guenter Wichmann, DTIC AD AD-A325 260, available from the Defense technical 
Information Service (DTIC), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ This report describes an antenna design which is capable 
of transmitting a sub-100ps pulse with little reflection, at the cost of very high attenuation and low output power 
of 10mW. 
 
Prof. Leslie Collins, Duke University, 919-660-5260, lcollins@ee.duke.edu, performed a study of the 
BRTRC/Wichmann radar data set and claims "100% Correct Identification"VIII of a number of APLs, including 
PMA-3, M-14 and VS-50. This research was supported by JUXOCOE. The briefing is included in this report4.  A 
telecon with Prof. Collins on 01 March 1999 indicated that she used a very small data sample, so the results and 
claims are not conclusive. The analysis of the data followed in part the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test 
(GLRT).  The BRTRC/Wichmann antenna is a ca. 0.5m linear array of eight transmit/receive antennas sample 
the surface about every 10cm. 
 
2.4. ASTAMIDS: 
According to Mr. Locke of NVESD and Dr. Altshuler of DARPA, the ASTAMIDS program failed to pass the 
previous milestone and the program has been returned to the tech base, i.e., back to R&D (PE 6.2).  The system 
failed due to the inability of the IR sensor to reliably detect mines at a distance.  The program has now been 
renamed the Light AirBorne Mine Detector (LAMD). 
 
2.5. Acoustic/Laser Device 
Prof. James Sabatier, 601-232-5404, sabatier@olemiss.eduu, has a news release at 
http://www.olemiss.edu/news/newsdesk/story438.html which also claims "100% Correct Identification" of a 
number of APL and ATL at Ft. A.P. Hill tests in 1998. He explained to me that the system works by scanning a 
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laser beam across a suspect area while exciting seismic waves over the area. The laser is claimed to be able to 
permit the detection of the mines.  Works poorly in vegetated environments. 
 
2.6. DARPA Dogsnose/NQR Program 
Details of the DARPA chemical detection and nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) programs are described at 
http://www.darpa.mil/dso/rd/Applied/UXO/index.html No additional comments are offered here. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The US Army demining technology program is maturing, with some erratic programmatic behavior due to lack 
of clear success of any single or group of technologies.  The 18-month delay in HSTAMIDS and the 
restructuring of ASTAMIDS are clear evidence of this; however, the enthusiasm for continuing is encouraging, 
as the US clearly recognizes the need for a solution to the mine detection problem.  The progress of GSTAMIDS 
is promising.  
 
The lack of a consistent methodology for performance evaluation and system comparison leads to a "floating 
baseline" for competing systems to meet.  
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Table 4. Personnel Contacted 
Contact Company/Org. Phone Title E-mail Address 
Fred Clodfelter BRTRC [1] 703-205-1535  fclodfel@brtrc.com 
Roger Rogowski BRTRC/Wichmann [1] 703-205-1544  rogowski@brtrc.com 
Dr. William Steinway Coleman Research ... [1] 407-352-3700 PM, CRC HSTAMIDS Bill_Steinway@mail.crc.com 
Thomas W Altshuler DARPA [1] 703-696-0222 PM, DARPA APL Alternatives taltshul@ida.org 
Regina Dugan DARPA [1] 703-696-2296 PM, DSO Dogsnose Program rdugan@darpa.mil 
Leslie M. Collins Duke University [1] 919-660-5260 Professor lcollins@ee.duke.edu 
Stacy L. Tantum Duke University [1] 919-660-5262  slt@ee.duke.edu 
Jory Cafferky EG&G/GSTAMIDS [1] 505-998-0677 PM, GSTAMIDS caffej@egginc.com 
Bob Penninger GDE Systems [1] 619-675-2605 PM, GDE HSTAMIDS  
Thomas Gorman Geo-Centers [1] 617-964-7070 PM, GSTAMIDS tomgorman@tech.geo-centers.com 
Tom McNiff GEO- Centers [1] 703-764-3298  tommcniff@aol.com 
Ron Kelly Jaycor [1] 703-847-4006 PM, Jaycor Stand-off Detector rkelly@jaycor.com 
Mike Jennings JPO/MCM/ACTD [1] 703-704-1032 Director, Army ACTD mjenning@nvl.army.mil 
Amber Kasbeer JUXOCOE [1] 703-704-1838 PM, Air Force UCOCOE akasbeer@nvl.army.mil 
Dick Weaver JUXOCOE [1] 703-704-1090 Director, JUXOCOE dweaver@nvl.army.mil 
Beverly Briggs NVESD [1] 703-704-1073 PM, DoD Hum. Demining Progs  
Zenon Derzko NVESD [1] 703-704-3236  zderzko@nvl.army.mil 
Peter Howard NVESD [1] 703-704-2636 COTR, GSTAMIDS phoward@invel.army.mil 
Christine Lee NVESD [1] 703-704-1842  clee@nvl.army.mil 
David Lee NVESD [1] 703-704-1063   
Mark Locke NVESD [1] 703-704-2418 COTR, HSTAMIDS mlocke@nvl.army.mil 
Harvin McFaddin NVESD [1] 703-704-2434  hmcfaddi@nvl.army.mil 
Kurt Montavon NVESD [1] 703-704-1381  kmontavo@nvl.army.mil 
Dennis Reidy NVESD [1] 703-704-1097 Test Site Coordinato dreidy@nvl.army.mil 
Ron Rupe NVESD [1] 703-704-2442 Project Engineer, ASTAMIDS  
Kelly Sherbondy NVESD [1] 703-704-2448 Director, MCM R&D ksherbon@nvl.army.mil 
Anh Trang NVESD [1] 703-704-2456  atrang@nvl.army.mil 
Edmund Zacharkevics NVESD [1] 703-704-1609  ezachark@nvl.army.mil 
Doug Sherburne NVESD (Camber, Inc.) [1] 703-704-1026  dsherbur@nvl.army.mil 
Peter Ngan NVESD Countermine [1]  703-704-2430  pngan@nvl.army.mil 
Phil Purdy Office of Naval Res... [1] 703)704-1975 PM,  ASTAMIDS jppurdy@nvl.army.mil 
James Sabatier University of Mississ... [1] 601-232-5404 Sr Research Scientist,NCPA sabatier@olemiss.eduu 
Jim Keller University of Missour... [1] 573-882-7339 Researcher, Fuzzy Logic keller@cecs.missouri.edu 
James Harvey US Army Research ... [1]  919-549-4244 PM, Demining MURI harvey@aro-emh1.army.mil 
Guenter Wischmann Wichmann   Roentgenstrasse 38, Heidelberg 
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ANNEX 6. SOME LINKS TO GENERAL AND MORE TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION ON HUMANITARIAN DEMINING  
 
This information is complementary to the one already provided in Annex 1: Existing information 
sources and databases. Please check in particular the pages at 
http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/mine10links.html, http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/mine10links.html
and http://etro.vub.ac.be/~eudem/eudemlinks.html 
 
•= A Summary of Land Mine WWW Pages: page with a load of links.  
•= Australian Specialist Dog Sections 
•= Canadian International Demining Center 
•= Canadian International Demining Center - bilder 
•= Countermine Solutions (Canadian Defence R&D)  
•= Countermine solutions: Very interesting, clear and down to earth overview of the long 
Canadian experience in the field of "Countermine" Information, Detection, Neutralization and 
Protection  
•= Danish Demining Research Forum  
•= DARPA DogsNose (Chemical Signatures, Trace Explosive Detection): DARPA's 3 year, 25 
M$ program, on the detection of landmines via their chemical signatures, inspired by the dogs' 
remarkable capabilities (http://web-ext2.darpa.mil/DSO/solicitations/index.html). See also the 
impressive Knowledge Warehouse (bibliography on the vapor detection of landmines), and 
the "older" database at http://eagle.sysplan.com/Info/LandMine/index.html 
•= DefenseLINK News: HUMANITARIAN DEMINING ON THE INTERNET  
•= Demining in Cambodia 
•= Demining Project, Information Search Strategy  
•= Demining Research at UWA (University of Western Australia, James Trevelyan): Excellent 
site on incremental, "down to earth" research projects (short term practical improvements), 
photograph gallery, Australian links 
(http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/Default.html). 
•= DeTeC - Demining Technology Center in Lausanne: This page contains a LOT of links on 
other sites, but also to all the technical ones by the producing companies. Situated at the 
Demining Technology Centre - frequently updated: 
http://diwww.epfl.ch/lami/detec/mine10links.html:  
•= DHA-Online - Uganda - Demining Information  
•= E.S.R.I. (ArcInfo) 
•= FHF´s Hemsida: The Swedish military doghandler's association presents itself.  
•= Gazette - special Phototour in Bosnia 
•= Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining: Information Management System 
for Mine Action; annual meetings for mine action managers and other stake-holders; training 
courses for mine action managers and information technology specialists; Technical studies 
(staff: 12-15 from the beginning of 1999) (http://www.gichd.ch/).  
•= GTD: A Spanish Company, EUREKA ANGEL project 
•= Guartel Ltd.: Maunfacturer of Metal Detectors.  
•= Guides | Landmines (OneWorld):Excellent source of information on the landmine problem 
(http://www.oneworld.org/guides/landmines/front.html). 
•= Handicap International 
•= HDIC Demining Category Pages  
•= Heartlands Group Ltd.: A UK-based Company  
•= Hemvärnshundar: Home Guard Norra Hälsingland presents itself in Swedish.  
•= http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/minefields
•= http://etro.vub.ac.be/~eudem/eudemlinks.html: some links established in regard to the 
EUDEM project 
•= http://etro.vub.ac.be/minedet: ETRO/VUB web site on the research activities related to 
demining 
•= Humanitarian demining 
•= Humanitarian Demining Equipment Catalog MEDDS K-9 Detection: Humanitarian Demining 
Catalog - Mine Detection Dogs 
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•= Humanitarian Demining Equipment Catalog, Free-leach K-9 Detection: Humanitarian 
Demining Catalog - Mine Detection Dogs free-leash search.  
•= Humanitarian Demining K-9 Program: Humanitarian Demining K-9 Program  
•= Humanitarian Demining Technology Development Programme (The Development 
Technology Unit (DTU) - Univ. of Warwick): Excellent effort, especially in the field of 
humanitarian land-mine clearance and the design of demining equipment and protective 
clothing for production in poor countries (http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/dtu/mines/) 
•= Humanitarian Demining: Esprit evaluates R&D proposals, plus other news  
•= Infinia: A Croatian Mine Clearance Vehicle Design (BAD LINK)  
•= International Campaign to Ban Landmines Winner of the 1997 Nobel Prize in Peace 
•= International Red Cross on humanitarian demining: web site of the international Red Cross 
•= Internet Petition to Ban Landmines in Memory of Diana 
•= IS Robotics: Counter mine and reconnaissance projects.  
•= Jan Bildtgårds hemsida: Swedish Policedogs site in english.  
•= JMU Humanitarian Demining Information Center Pages: HDIC at James Madison University: 
Center of Excellence in information collection, analysis, processing and dissemination 
(http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/demining.htm).  
•= K9 - Police Dog Homepage: The original Canadian site  
•= K9 - US Polishund hemsida: Swedish version of a good canadian site. Good own links. 
•= Kurd Web Minelinks 
•= Land Mine Awareness Education: Lots of information and practical descriptions as well as 
reports on Mine Awareness  
•= Landmine Ban Treaty Agreed in Oslo - Norway 
•= Landmines - NGO Committee on Disarmament: Info on international efforts to control and 
eliminate landmines (http://www.igc.apc.org/disarm/landmine.html). 
•= Landmines - the hidden enemy 
•= Landmines explosions-photogallery 
•= LANDMINES: Support to EC Humanitarian Demining R & D  
•= Landmines: What is Schools Demining Schools  
•= LANDMINES:EC Humanitarian Demining Web Site) 
•= Lawrence Livermore National Labs: Impulse Radar  
•= Linkpage: Peace & Security: Several links on land mines as well as other armed conflict pages 
•= Mark Daltons Summary of Land Mine WWW pages: Another "loads of links" page Menschen 
Gegen Minen: MGM, a large humanitarian group, with lots of links. The Humanitarian 
Foundation of People against Landmines. Addresses, links, online forum and much more.  
•= Midas Data Systems: Orbis, the Minefield Data Administration System  
•= Mine map over Sarajevo 
•= Minerats: Anti-personnel mine clearance robots.  
•= Mines and Minefields - Defining the Problem (Univ. of Western Australia)  
•= MineWeb Home Page 
•= MINWARA - The Mine Warfare Association  
•= Nordiska Polishundsidor: Police dog and Policedog handlers sites from all nordic countries.  
•= Norwegian People's Aid: Mines: The Silent Killers: The Landmine Problem and NPA's 
humanitarian demining concept/activity. One of the leading NGOs in Humanitarian Demining 
(http://www.npaid.no/mines/).  
•= OAO Robotics: Various teleoperated designs  
•= Oneworld: Contains photographs, video clips, and soundtracks 
•= Operation Landmine (from the Operation USA NGO): Focus on conversion of advanced 
American technology to the detection and destruction of AP landmines (overview of detection 
technologies etc.)  
•= (http://www.opusa.org/opland/index.html) 
•= Operation USA K-9  
•= Oxfam 
•= Peace and disarmament: Land mines - Canadian Forces College  
•= Pictures from Bosnien 
•= Pictures from Zagreb 
•= Princess Diana, 1961-1997  
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•= (Review) C&EN 970310 - LAND MINES: Horrors Begging for Solutions: Excellent review 
article on (chemical) detection methods. Interviews, glossary 
(http://pubs.acs.org/hotartcl/cenear/970310/land.html). 
•= Ronco Consulting Corp.: International Demining Consultants  
•= Safe-Lane:Live coverage of the Treaty Signing Conference in Ottawa December 2-4 as well 
as other information on the issue - this site also contains a nice thematically sorted link page. 
•= Schiebel: An Austrian mine clearance company  
•= Second International Conference on the Detection of Abandoned Land Mines: By Institution 
of Electrical Engineers  
•= The Cambodian Mine Action Centre: Cambodia's National Humanitarian Demining 
Organization. 
•= The International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
•= The Mines Advisory Group: One of the leading NGOs in Humanitarian Demining, with 
activities in North Iraq, Cambodia, Angola and Laos (others planned) 
(http://www.oneworld.org/mag/). 
•= The MineWeb: U.S. State Dept. Info on Bosnia.  
•= The Warchild Landmine Programme 
•= Trondheim Politi's tjenstehundklubb: Trondheims Policedogs presents itself in Swedish. 
•= U.S. Navy: Various designs for robotic countermining vehicles. 
•= UN information about Mine detection dogs  
•= United Nations Demining Database: Conference information, world reports, some links, UN 
Mine Action Policy, Points of Contact, Demining Programmes, Casualties and Incidents 
Reports from around the world, Landmines Magazine, International Mine Clearance 
Standards (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/). 
•= United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
•= United Nations Landmine Conference, Geneva  
•= United Nations on humanitarian demining 
•= United States Army: Extensive list of available and prospective technologies.  
•= University of Alberta: A mechanical means of land mine detection. 
•= University of Florida: X-ray backscatter 
•= University of Western Australia: Many Different Projects  
•= UXB International: An American UXO Disposal Company  
•= UXOCOE (Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence): Aims: to build a cooperative 
multinational effort to share expertise, data and test sites; to build and maintain a UXO 
detection and clearance database; to standardize target UXO (including land mines); establish 
benchmarks, metrics, milestones and deliverables. Work your way especially towards the 
huge SIGNATURE DATABASE and a number of interesting documents 
(http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/UXOCOE/uxocoe.html).  
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation: International humanitarian, advocacy, and educational 
organization dedicated to assisting the victims of war. Played pivotal role in international campaign to 
ban landmines (http://www.vvaf.org/). Excellent Landmine Library - Resource List at 
http://www.vvaf.org/library/resource_list.html.   
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ANNEX 7. COORDINATES OF THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT WERE CONTACTED FOR THE SURVEY 
 
Ti First name Family Name Institute Tel Fax E-mail Homepage 
Mr. Håvard Bach Norwegian People's Aid 
(NPA) Angola 
+244 2 32 10 83 +244 2 32 10 83 npa.ang.bach@ebonet.net, 
havard.bach@npaid.no 
http://www.npaid.no/mines/, 
http://www.npaid.no/npaid/addresses.html 
Mr. Håvard Hoksnes Norwegian People's Aid 
(NPA) Angola 
+244 2 32 10 83 +244 2 32 10 83 npa.ang.repres@ebonet.net,  
npa-ang@angonet.gn.apc.org 
http://www.npaid.no/mines/, 
http://www.npaid.no/npaid/addresses.html 
Dr. Alan Rye Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation 
+61 8 8259 6301 +61 8 8259 5200 Alan.Rye@dsto.defence.gov.au http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/esrl/ssd/tss
d/sensapps.html 
Mr. Roy Bird Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation 
(DSTO) 
  roy.bird@dsto.defence.gov.au http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/ 
   Defence Science and 
Technology Organization 
(DSTO) 
+61 8 8259 5184 +61 8 8259 5055  http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/ 
   Minelab Electronics Pty Ltd. +61 8 8238 0888 +61 8 8238 0890 ho@minelab.com.au http://www.minelab.com.au/ 
Prof. James Trevelyan The University of Western 
Australia 
+61 8 9380 3057 +61 8 9380 1024 jamest@mech.uwa.edu.au http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/
Default.html 
Mr. Dieter Schrottmayer SCHIEBEL Elektronische 
Geräte GmbH 
+43 1 546 26  
Ext.87 
+43 1 545 2339 disc@schiebel.com  
Mr. Bart Weetjens APOPO +32 3 216 3534 +32 3 230 6616 billet@uia.ua.ac.be  
Dr. R. P. Slegtenhorst DELFT SENSOR SYSTEMS +32 55 333 811 +32  55 316 895   
Cmdt. M. Lambrechts DOVO +32 16 93 20 41 +32  16 93 21 48   
Ms. Maria 
Cristina 
Marolda EC, DGXII B1 (EUREKA) +32 2 295 8391 +32 2 296 4289 maria-cristina.marolda@dg12.cec.be http://www.eureka.be/ 
Mr. Jean-Paul Salmon Ecole Royale Militaire (ERM) +32 2 737 6306  Jean.Paul.Salmon@rswo.rma.ac.be http://www.rma.ac.be/ 
Mr. Patrick Van Hove EU-DGIII +32 2 296 8106 +32 2 296 16 92 patrick.vanhove@dg3.cec.be http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/hphdhome.ht
m 
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Mr. Michele Cervone EU-DGVIII +32 2 295 2450 +32 2 296 7449 michele.cervone@dg8.cec.be  
Mr. Geoffrey van Orden European Commission +32 2 295 5551 +32 2 295 0580   
Mr. Rolf Linkohr European Parliament +32 2 284 5452 +32 2 284 9452 rlinkohr@europarl.eu.int  
Mr. G. d'Allemagne Handicap International +32 2 280 16 01 +32  2 230 95 14,  
+32 2 230 60 30 
handicap.international.be@infoboard.
be 
http://www.creativem.com/handicap/ 
Prof. Marc Acheroy Royal Military Academy 
(RMA-ERM) 
+32 2 737 6470 +32 2 737 6472 marc.acheroy@elec.rma.ac.be http://www.rma.ac.be/~acheroy/, 
http://jupiter.ulb.ac.be/mines/home.html 
Mr. Robert Cox European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
+32 2 647 3833 +32 2 647 3833 106500.3105@compuserve.com http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index.html 
   European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) 
+32 2 295 4400 +32 2 295 4572 echo@echo.cec.be http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/index.html 
Mr. Pierre Lamontagne Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) 
+855 23 210316  cancon@camnet.com.kh  
Mr. Sam Sotha Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) 
+855 23 981 083, 
 +855 23 981 084 
+855 23 360 096 dir_cmac@forum.org.kh  
Dr. John E. McFee Defence Research 
Establishment Suffield 
(DRES) 
+1 403 544 4739 +1 403 544 4704 John.McFee@dres.dnd.ca http://www.dres.dnd.ca/, 
http://www.crad.dnd.ca/counter/index_e.ht
ml 
Mr. Milan Bajic Croatian Mine Action Centre +385 1 6158692 +385 44 547950 milan.bajic@zg.tel.hr  
Mr. Damir Gorseta Croatian Mine Action Centre +385 44 547960 +385 44 547950   
Mr. Richard Todd UN Mine Action Center 
(MAC) 
+385 1 3780004,  
+385 1 3780007 
+385 1 3780101 Richard.Todd@public.srce.hr  
Mr. Lars B. Kristensen A/S HYDREMA +45 98 37 13 33 +45 98 37 22 11, 
+45 98 37 19 96 
 http://www.hydrema.com/ 
Dr. Ole Nymann CAT Science Park +45 46 77 59 05,  
+ 45 46 77 59 19 
+45 46 32 19 19 ole.nymann@catscience.dk, cat-
olny@cat.risoe.dk 
http://www.catscience.dk/ddrf/ddrf.html 
Mr. Erik K. Lauritzen DEMEX Consulting 
Engineers A/S 
+45 3810 8970 +45 3833 1317 el@demex.dk  
Mr. Lars Christensen PL BRAKE +45 3879 2767,  
+45 2049 5447 
+45 3879 2787, 
+45 3035 7347 
pl_brake@usa.net http://www.pl_brake.com 
A.Pro
f 
Kaj Bjarne Jakobsen Technical University of 
Denmark 
+45 4525 5255 +45 4588 0286 kbj@iae.dtu.dk http://www.catscience.dk/ddrf/projects.html
, http://www.dtu.dk/ 
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A.Pro
f 
Helge B. D. Sørensen Technical University of 
Denmark 
+45 4525 5244 +45 4588 0286 hbs@iae.dtu.dk http://www.catscience.dk/ddrf/projects.html
, http://www.dtu.dk/ 
Mr. Simo Pajulahti Patria Vehicles Oy +358 3 645 2469 +358 3 619 6710, 
+358 3 645 2210 
simo.pajulahti@pp.kolumbus.fi, 
vehicles@patria.fi 
http://www.patria.fi/ 
Mr. Ronald Blanpain CEA-LETI (Laboratoire 
d'Electronique de Technologie 
et d'Instrumentation) 
+33 4 76 88 46 76 +33 4 76 88 51 59 roland.blanpain@cea.fr http://www-
dta.cea.fr/WWWCEA/leti/fr/leti.htm 
Mr. Denis Duret CEA-LETI (Laboratoire 
d'Electronique de Technologie 
et d'Instrumentation) 
+33 4 76 88 49 96 +33 4 76 88 51 59 dduret@cea.fr http://www-
dta.cea.fr/WWWCEA/leti/fr/leti.htm 
Mr. Claude Dehouck CIDEV (Conseil International 
de Development) 
+33 1 4495 2970 +33 1 4495 2979   
Mr. Christophe Courtade Dassault Electronique +33 1 3481 3286 +33 1 3481 3104 christophe.Courtade@detexis.thomson
-csf.com 
 
Mr. Gilles Guillemard Dassault Electronique +33 1 3481 3293 +33 1 3481 3104 gilles.guillemard@dassault-elec.fr  
Dr. Emmanuel Duflos Ecole d’Ingenieurs, Institut 
Superieur d’Electronique du 
Nord (ISEN) 
+33 3 20 30 40 26 +33 3 20 30 40 51 duflos@isen.fr  
Ms. Carmen Dumitrescu EPPRA sarl +33 1 69 33 30 98 +33 1 69 33 43 83 carmen@eppra.polytechnique.fr http://www.idsi.qds.fr/Entreprise/eppra.htm 
Mr. Ben Lark Handicap International +33 4 78 69 79 79 +33 4 78 69 79 94 mineslyon@compuserve.com http://www.handicap-international.org/ 
Dr. Jean-
Baptiste 
Richardier Handicap International +33 4 78 69 79 79 +33 4 78 69 79 94 101511.625@compuserve.com, 
handicap_int_lyon@compuserve.com 
http://www.handicap-international.org/ 
Mr. Jean-Noel Sersiron Handicap International +33 4 78 69 79 79 +33 4 78 69 79 94 101511.625@compuserve.com, 
handicap_int_lyon@compuserve.com 
http://www.handicap-international.org/ 
Mr. Pierre Naz Institute of Saint-Louis (ISL) +33 3 89 69 50 98 +33 3 89 69 50 02 isl.naz.pierre@cedocar.fr, 
islnp@concorde.cedocar.fr 
 
Mr. Bernard Foucault Matra Bae Dynamics +31 1 34 88 1808 +31 1 34 88 2119 bfoucault@matra-def.fr  
Mr. Alain Gaillet ONERA (Office National 
D'Etudes et de Recherche 
Aerospatiales) 
+33 5 62 25 2774 +33 5 62 25 2564 Alain.Gaillet@cert.fr http://www.onera.fr/ 
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Mr. Christian Hamon SAGEM SA Defence and 
Security Division 
+33 1 34 30 52 12, 
+33 1 34 30 52 38 
+33 1 34 30 50 12   
Mr. Philippe Garreau SATIMO (Societe 
d'Applications 
Technologiques de l'Imagerie 
Micro-Onde) 
+33 1 69 29 02 47 +33 1 69 29 02 27 pgarreau@satimo.fr http://www.satimo.com/ 
Mr. P. Bach SODERN (Societe Anonyme 
d'Etudes et Realisations 
Nucleaires) 
+33 1 45 95 70 00 +33 1 45 69 14 02   
Dr. François Nivelle THOMSON-CSF Missile 
Electronics 
+33 1 49 65 31 61 +33 1 49 65 36 36 nivelle@tme.thomson.fr  
Mr. Claude Chekroun Thomson-CSF Radant +33 1 30 67 87 34 +33 1 30 67 87 87   
Mr. Stephane Parizet Thomson-CSF Radant +33 1 30 67 87 43, 
+33 1 30 67 87 32 
+33 1 30 67 87 87   
Mr. Klaus Scheerer BGT Bodenseewerk 
Gerätetechnick GmbH 
+49 7551 896790 +49 7551 894687 klaus.scheerer@bgt.de  
Mr. Detlef Schulz BIGAT GmbH +49 30 29373141 +49 30 29373140 BIGAT@recyclers-info.de http://www.recyclers-info.de/de/bigat/ 
Mr. Martin Fritzsche Daimler-Benz AG +49 731 505 2114 +49 731 505 4110 fritzsche@dbag.ulm.DaimlerBenz.co
m 
 
Mr. Martin Paul Auracher DEMIRA (Deutsche 
Minenräumer) e.V. 
+49 6442 931700 +49 6442 931701   
Dr. Wolfgang Eschner Dornier GmbH +49 7545 8 97 66 +49 7545 9 10 83   
Mr. Theodore Steinbüschel Ebinger GmbH +49 2203 36063 +49 2203 36062 ebinger@ebingergmbh.de http://www.ebingergmbh.de/ 
Mr. Klaus Ebinger Ebinger GmbH +49 2203 36063 +49 2203 36062 ebinger@ebingergmbh.de http://www.ebingergmbh.de/ 
Mr. Hans P. Dworak European Space Agency 
(ESA) 
+49 6151 90 2737 +49 6151 90 3402 hdworak@esoc.esa.de  
   FFG Flensburger 
Fahrzeugbau GmbH 
+49 461 4812 176 +49 461 4812 100 info@ffg-flensburg.de http://www.ffg-flensburg.de/, 
http://www.diehl.com/stand4_4.htm 
Mr. Reinhard Ebert FGAN-FfO +49 7071 709955 +49 7071 790270 ebert@ffo.fgan.de http://www.fgan.de/ 
Dr. Michael Krausa Fraunhofer Institut für 
Chemische Technologie (ICT)
+49 721 46 40 444 +49 721 46 40 111 kra@ict.fhg.de http://www.ict.fhg.de/ 
Mr. Knud Vielhaben Gebr. Vielhaben GmbH +49 40 5 21 07 0 +49 40 5 21 07 41   
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Mr. Günter Mulack German Foreign Office +49 228 173128 +49 228 173342 113564.3641@compuserve.com http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 
Mr. Wolfgang Nierwetberg HELP, Hilfe zur Selbtshilfe 
e.V. 
+49 228 915 29 0 +49 228 915 29 99   
Mr. Helmut Derlich IABG (Industrieanlagen-
Betriebsgesellschaft mbH) 
+49  89 6088 3668 +49  89 6088 3298 derlich@iabg.de http://www.iabg.de/ 
Mr. Klaus Ausländer Institut Dr. Friedrich Förster, 
Prüfgerätebau GmbH & Co. 
KG 
+49 7121 140 264 +49 7121 140 280 foerster.auslaender@t-online.de  
Mr. Thomas Himmler Institut Dr. Friedrich Förster, 
Prüfgerätebau GmbH & Co. 
KG 
+49 7121 140 311 +49 7121 140 280   
Mr. Hanns-Peter Trinkhaus Institut Dr. Friedrich Förster, 
Prüfgerätebau GmbH & Co. 
KG 
+49 7121 140 489,  
0171 3021624 
+49 7121 140 280   
Prof. 
Dr. 
Jürgen W. Leonhardt IUT Institut für 
Umwelttechnologien GmbH 
+49 30 6392 4549, 
+49 30 6392 5511?
+49 30 6392 4831   
Dr. Rupert Neudeck Komitee CAP ANAMUR - 
Deutsche Not-Ärzte e.V. 
+49 221 12 2166 +49 221 12 1668 capanamur@t-online.de http://cap-anamur.org/, 
http://www.dse.de/zd/arbeit/komitee.htm 
Mr. Walter Krohn Krohn GmbH & Co KG +49 2653 6494 +49 2653 6496   
Mr. Thomas Gebauer Medico International e.V. +49 69 944 38 30 +49 69 436002 th.gebauer@t-online.de, 
medico_international@t-online.de 
http://www.medico-international.de/ 
Mr. Hendrik Ehlers MgM Stiftung Menschen 
gegen Minen 
+49 2151 96999,  
+49 171 6397722 
+49 2151 511448 ehlers@mgm.org http://www.mgm.org/ 
Mr. Thomas Heufelder Phoenix Humanitarian 
Demining e.V. 
+49 7836 7547 +49 7836 2499 phoenix.humanitarian.demining@t-
online.de 
http://home.t-
online.de/home/phdgermany/homepage.htm
, http://www.phoenix.notrix.de/ 
   Sprengschule Dresden +49 351 40 15 768 +49 351 40 15 765 sprengschule.dresden@t-online.de http://www.sprengschule-dresden.de/ 
Mr. Gerhard Bornmann Stiftung Sankt Barbara +49 50 55 8900 +49 50 55 5053 100671.1564@compuserve.com http://www.dsk.de/rds/20013.htm 
Mr. Christian Süssenbach Tauber Spezialtiefbau +49 251 328 0750 +49 251 32 5952 tauber-muenster@t-online.de, rauber-
muenster@t.onune.de ? 
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Mr. Tom Walati Thomson-CSF Elektronik 
GmbH 
+49 431 7056 0,   
+49 431 7056 144 
+49 431 7056 138 walati@thomson.netzservice.de  
Mr. Stefan Schultheiss TRICON - Geophysik und 
Systemtechnik GmbH 
+49 89 427 20250, 
0172 9445988 
+49 89 427 20251 tricon@t-online.de  
Mr. Heinz Hilgendorf TZN Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungszentrum GmbH 
+49 5827 87631 +49 5827 5356   
   TZN Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungszentrum GmbH 
+49 5827 870 +49 5827 5064   
Prof. 
Dr. 
Wolfgang Göpel University of Tübingen +49 7071 2976904 +49 7071 29 6910 wg@ipc.uni-tuebingen.de, 
group.goepel@ipc.uni-tuebingen.de 
http://www.ipc.uni-tuebingen.de/ 
Mr. Gerhard Vallon Vallon GmbH +49 7121 98550 +49 7121 83643 Vallon-GmbH@t-online.de http://www.vallon.de/ 
Dr. Helmut Süss Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- 
und Raumfahrt (DLR) e.V. 
+49 8153 28 2372 +49 8153 28 1135 helmut.suess@dlr.de http://www.dlr.de/NE-HF/ 
Dr. Kenneth Dawson-
Howe 
The University of Dublin, 
Trinity College 
+353 1 608 1220 +353 1 677 2204 Kenneth.Dawson-Howe@cs.tcd.ie http://www.cs.tcd.ie/Kenneth.Dawson-
Howe/, 
http://www.cs.tcd.ie/kdawson/landmines.ht
ml 
   Elta Electronics Industries 
Ltd. 
+972 8 8572414 +972 8 8572970  http://www.elta-
iai.com/site/catalog/radar_d.html 
Dr. Jehuda Yinon Weizmann Institute of 
Science 
+972 8 934 2522, 
 +972 8 934 2053 
 ciyinon@wis.weizmann.ac.il, 
ciyinon@weizmann.weizmann.ac.il? 
 
Mr. Mario Sepe Appalti Bonifiche Costruzioni 
(ABC) sas 
+39 055 234 7232, 
+39 055 234 7213, 
+39 055 247 7358 
+39 055 247 6074 siscam@ats.it http://www.cesvit.it/rtrt/catalogo/abc.htm 
Ing. Luigi Zanzi Dip. Elettronica e 
Informazione 
+39 02 23993575, 
+39 360 683865 
+39 02 23993413 zanzi@elet.polimi.it http://cerbero.elet.polimi.it/people/zanzi 
Mr. Alberto Bicci IDS Ingegneria dei Sistemi 
S.p.A 
+39 050 312 4220 +39 050 312 4201 idspisa.signature@tin.it http://www.ids-spa.it/ 
Mr. Giancarlo Nebbia Istituto Nazionale di Fisica 
Nucleare (INFN) 
+39 049 8277134 +39 049 8762641 nebbia@pd.infn.it http://infn.science.unitn.it/explodet/ 
Prof. Giuseppe Viesti Istituto Nazionale di Fisica 
Nucleare (INFN) 
+39 049 8277124 +39 049 8762641 viesti@pd.infn.it http://infn.science.unitn.it/explodet/ 
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Mr. John Trevor Dean Joint Research Centre (JRC) +39 0332 789407 +39 0332 785469 john.dean@jrc.it http://www.ei.jrc.it/landmines/jrc.html 
Dr. Alois Sieber Joint Research Centre (JRC) +39 0332 789089 +39 0332 785469 alois.sieber@jrc.it http://www.ei.jrc.it/landmines/jrc.html 
Mr. Umberto 
Lucio 
Valentini Progetto Gulbibi c/o 
Missionari Saveriani 
+39 030 377 7280 +39 030 377 2781   
Dr. Lorenzo Capineri Ultrasound Laboratory and 
NDT 
+39 055 4796376 +39 055 494569 capineri@ingfi1.ing.inifi.it  
Mr. Tim McGregor JAHDS (Japan Alliance for 
Humanitarian Demining 
Support) 
+81 3 3731 3650 +81 3 3731 3650 timcgreg@infohwy.com, 
timcgreg@insync.net 
http://www.geosearch.co.jp/cover/index.ht
ml 
Mr. Hiroshi Tomita JAHDS (Japan Alliance for 
Humanitarian Demining 
Support) 
+81 3 3731 3650 +81 3 3731 3650  http://www.geosearch.co.jp/cover/index.ht
ml 
Mr. Jacky D'Almeida UN/Accelerated Demining 
Program - Mozambique 
+258 1 466011 +258 1 466013  http://www.tropical.co.mz/~plans/ 
Prof. Lawrence Carter University of Auckland +64 9 373 7599 +64 9 373 7461 lj.carter@auckland.ac.nz  
Mr. Geir Bjørsvik Norwegian People's Aid 
(NPA) 
+47 22 03 7608 +47 22 20 0877 npaid@npaid.no http://www.npaid.no/mines/, 
http://www.npaid.no/npaid/addresses.html 
Mr. Egil Eide Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology 
+47 735 94472 +47 7350 7322 Egil.Eide@tele.ntnu.no http://www.tele.ntnu.no/radio/epeople.htm 
Prof. Jens Hjelmstad Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology 
+47 735 94308 +47 7350 7322 hjelmsta@tele.ntnu.no, 
jfh@edh.ericsson.se 
http://www.tele.ntnu.no/radio/epeople.htm 
Mr. Ian Bullpitt Mine Action Center for 
Afghanistan (MACA) 
+92 51 211 451 ,  
+92 351 263 106 
+92 51 211 450 bullpitt@undpafg.org.pk http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/ 
Mr. Richard Kidd UNOCHA +92 51 211 451 +92 51 211 450   
Prof. Luis Pinheiro University of Aveiro +351 34 370 757 +351 34 370 605, 
+351 1 471 8941 
lmp@zeus.ci.ua.pt  
Dr. Alexander Bodnya Kaliningrad State University 
(KSU) 
+7 0112 46 98 05 +7 0112 46 58 13 alexb@kvant.ksu.kern.ru http://www.ksu.kern.ru/grechishkin/ 
Mr. Brian Arendse CSIR-Aerotek +27 12 841 3703 +27 12 349 1766, 
+27 12 349 1760? 
barendse@csir.co.za http://aeroweb.aero.csir.co.za/landmine/ind
ex.html 
Dr. Vernon Joynt MECHEM Consultants +27 12 803 7290,  
+27 82 892 3322 
+27 12 803 7189 mecjum@mechem.denel.co.za, 
mecdoc@mechem.denel.co.za 
http://www.denel.co.za/mechem/ 
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Mr. Francisco 
Javier 
Varas 
Noriega 
GTD, Ingenieria de Sistemas 
y Software Industrial, S.A. 
+34 93 225 5125 +34 93 225 5122 fjv@gtd.es http://www.gtd.es/ 
Mr. Sten-
Anders 
Brink Biosensor Applications AB +46 19 261100 +46 19 261101 Sten-Anders.Brink@bat.bofors.se  
Mr. Allan Carlsson Bofors AB Weapon Systems +46 586 81000 +46 586 85700  http://www.army-
technology.com/contractors/mines/bofors/in
dex.html 
Mr. Claes Lindskog CelsiusTech Electronics AB +46 8 580 854 09 +46 8 580 322 44 cali@celsiustech.se http://www.celsiustech.se/ 
Mr. Gunnar Tellås CelsiusTech Electronics AB +46 8 580 857 52 +46 8 580 872 73 gla@celsiustech.se http://www.celsiustech.se/ 
Mr. Carl-Erik Olsson Countermine Engineering AB +46 8 55 08 08 55, 
+46 70 59 44 200 
+46 8 55 08 08 60   
Mr. Staffan Abrahamson National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA) 
+46 13 31 8455,  
+46 13 31 8000 
+46 13 31 8100 staabr@lin.foa.se http://www.foa.se/, 
http://www.s2.chalmers.se/~brunzell/projec
t.html 
Mr. Bertil Brusmark National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA) 
+46 13 31 8000 +46 13 31 8100 berbru@lin.foa.se http://www.foa.se/, 
http://www.s2.chalmers.se/~brunzell/projec
t.html 
Ms. Anna-Lena Christiansen National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA) 
+46 13 31 80 11 +46 13 31 82 87 annalena@lin.foa.se  
Mr. Hans Lok National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA) 
+46 13 31 83 67 +46 13 31 81 00 hanlok@lin.foa.se  
Mr. Stefan Sjokvist National Defence Research 
Establishment (FOA) 
+46 13 31 80 00 +46 13 31 82 87 stesjo@lin.foa.se  
Mr. Per Wikström Radarteam Sweden AB +46 921 191 91 +46 921 553 39 perwik@radarteam.se, 
info@radarteam.se 
http://www.radarteam.se/ 
Mr. Nigel Daniel Skoldskjaer & Tower ab. +46 8 240221 +46 8 102616 s.tower@stockholm.mail.telia.com  
   SRF Humanity Dog +46 8 39 90 00 +46 8 39 94 39 info@humanitydog.se http://www.humanitydog.se/ 
Mr. Lennart Wetterholm Swedish Armed Forces Dog 
Instruction Center 
+46 8 607 31 13 +46 8 607 35 14  http://www.mil.se/FM/flyg/fhtc/index_e.ht
ml 
Mr. Michel Diot Fédération Suisse de 
Déminage (FSD) 
+41 26 400 0834 +41 26 400 0832 michel.diot@com.mcnet.ch  
Mr. Patrick 
Martin 
Blagden Geneva International Center 
for Humanitarian Demining 
+41 31 323 5476 +41 31 323 5477   
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Amba
ssado
r 
François Godet Geneva International Center 
for Humanitarian Demining 
+41 31 323 5476 +41 31 323 5477 francois.godet@gs-emd.admin.ch  
Mr. Dominique Loye International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) 
+41 22 730 2749,  
+41 22 734 6001 
+41 22 733 2057 dloye@icrc.org http://www.icrc.org/ 
Dr. Hans 
Martin 
Braun RST (Radar Systemtechnik 
AG) 
+41 71 311 2875 +41 71 311 2876 rst.hb@tele-net.ch  
Mr. Reto Haeni Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) 
+41 1 632 6365 +41 1 632 1914 haeni@sipo.reok.ethz.ch http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/ 
Mr. Rolf Oechslin SM Swiss Munition 
Entreprise 
+41 41 875 7603 +41 41 875 7672   
Prof. 
Dr. 
J. L. Van 
Genderen 
International Institute for 
Aerospace Survey & Earth 
Sciences 
+31 534874254 +31 534874482 genderen@itc.nl http://www.itc.nl 
Mr. Jacques Rosenboom Ministry of Defence +31 70 316 9476 +31 70 316 8072, 
+31 70 316 8413? 
  
Ms. Yvonne 
H.L. 
Janssen TNO Defence Research +31 70 374 0455 +31 70 328 09 61, 
+31 70 374 0654? 
Y.H.L.Janssen@fel.tno.nl http://www.tno.nl/instit/fel/ 
Mr. David J. Sadler Aardvark Clear Mine Ltd +44 1464 820122 +44 1464 820985 aardmine@netcomuk.co.uk  
   Adams Electronics +44 1342 823856 +44 1342 826100 sales@adamselec.demon.co.uk http://www.adamselec.demon.co.uk/indext.
htm 
Mr. Guy Lucas BACTEC International Ltd. +44 1634 29 6757 +44 1634 29 6779 bactecint@aol.com, 
Bactec.int@virgin.net 
http://www.bactec.com/ 
Mr. Alistair Craib Baric (Consultants) Ltd +44 1304 620082 +44 1304 620014 100617.1354@compuserve.com  
Mr. Steve Archibald CARE UK +44 171 379 5247 +44 171 379 0543  http://www.care.org/ 
Maj. Colin King Colin King Associates +44 1293 785277 +44 1293 785277 colin_king_associates@compuserve.c
om 
 
Prof. D.M. Parkes DERA / DRA Malvern +44 1684 895132 +44 1684 894957 dmparkes@dera.gov.uk http://www.dra.hmg.gb/dera.htm 
Maj. Neville Goulton DERA Chertsey +44 1344 63 3349 +44 1344 63 3099 LS4@dera.gov.uk http://www.dra.hmg.gb/dera.htm 
Mr. J.G. Hambly DERA Chertsey +44 1344 633069 +44 1344 633100   
Mr. Colin Lowe DERA Chertsey +44 1344 63 3349, 
+44 1344 63 3053 
+44 1344 63 3099 esf3@dra.hmg.gb http://www.dra.hmg.gb/dera.htm 
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Mr. Mick Prince Development Technology 
Workshop 
+44 1203 694717, 
+44 1203 522339 
+44 1203 694717 dtw@eng.warwick.ac.uk http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/mines/ 
Dr. Richard J. Chignell EMRAD Limited +44 1252 628880 +44 1252 625556 enquiries@emrad.com http://www.emrad.com/ 
Mr. David J. Daniels ERA Technology Ltd +44 1372 367084 +44  1372 367081 david.daniels@era.co.uk  
Mr. David Hewitson Greenfield Consultants +44 171 622 0373 +44 181 675 7277 100545.573@compuserve.com  
Mr. Ollie Allerhead Guartel Limited +44 181 896 0222 +44 181 896 0333 info@guartel.com http://www.guartel.com/ 
Mr. Howard M. Thompson H.M.T. Insurance Brokers 
Ltd. 
+44 181 398 2362 +44 181 398 4568 hme@intonet.co.uk  
Mr. Michael Goodall Heartlands Group Ltd +44 1954 718408 +44 1954 718134 hrtlnduk@aol.com http://www.heartlandsuk.com/ 
Prof. John A.S. Smith King's College London +44 171 873 2699 +44 171 873 2699 john.smith@kcl.ac.uk  
Mr. Lyn Haywood Miltra Engineering Ltd +44 1923 818342 +44 1923 818342   
Mr. Lou McGrath Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG) 
+44 1900 828580, 
+44 1900 828688 
+44 1900 827088  http://www.oneworld.org/mag/intro.html 
Mr. Geraint Jones Redcliffe Magtronics Ltd. +44 1179 771404 +44 1179 723013 geraint@redmag.co.uk, 
redcliffe@redmag.co.uk 
http://www.redmag.co.uk/ 
Prof. Roger Voles RV Consultancy +44 181 747 9550 +44 181 747 9550   
Mr. Marcus Baker Shadow Robot Project +44 171 700 2487  marcus@shadow.org.uk http://www.shadow.org.uk/projects/minecle
arer/mineclearer.shtml 
   Specialist Gurkha Services 
(SGS) 
+44 1795 666488 +44 1795 580866 100311.3511@compuserve.com  
Mr. Guy Willoughby The HALO Trust +44 171 821 9244 +44 171 834 0198   
Mr. Noel Mulliner UK Ministry of Defence +44 171 218 1318 +44 171 218 6276 deminingdmo.mod@gtnet.gov.uk  
Prof. Ralph Benjamin University of Bristol +44 117 928 9000 +44 117 9289 
2396 
R.Benjamin@bristol.ac.uk http://www.bristol.ac.uk/, 
http://www.fen.bris.ac.uk/elec/electeng.htm
l 
Prof. David Bloor University of Durham +44 191 374 2391 +44 191 374 3848 david.bloor@durham.ac.uk http://www.durham.ac.uk/ 
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Prof. Stephen H. Salter University of Edinburgh +44 131 650 5703 +44 131 650 5702 shs@mech.ed.ac.uk, 
rdietrich@lineone.net 
http://www.dervish.org/ 
Mr. Russel Gasser University of Warwick +44 1203 523122, 
+44 1203 522339 
+44 1203 418922 esrpo@eng.warwick.ac.uk, 
dtu@eng.warwick.ac.uk 
http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/mines/ 
Mr. John Davies Barringer Instruments Inc. +1 908 665 8200 +1 908 665 8298 info@bii.barringer.com , 
info@barringer.com 
http://www.barringer.com/explosives.html 
Dr. Regina Dugan DARPA Defense Science 
Office (DSO) 
+1 703 696 2296 +1 703 696 3999, 
+1 703 696 0218 
rdugan@darpa.mil http://web-
ext2.darpa.mil/DSO/personnel/rdugan.htm,  
http://web-
ext2.darpa.mil/DSO/rd/Applied/UXO/index
.html 
Mr. Arnold Dean GEO-CENTERS, Inc. +1 617 964 7070 +1 617 527 7592 adean@tech.geo-centers.com http://www.geo-centers.com/ 
Prof. Paul Horowitz Harvard University +1 617 495 3037,  
+1 617 495 3265 
 paulh@huhepl.harvard.edu http://mc.harvard.edu/mines/, 
http://mc.harvard.edu/mines/jason.htm 
Mr. Dennis Barlow James Madison University 
(JMU) 
+1 540 568 2756 +1 540 568 8176 barlowdc@jmu.edu, hdic@jmu.edu http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/ 
Prof. Kosta Tsipis M.I.T. +1 617 253 3647 +1 617 253 4235 tsipis@mit.edu  
Mr. Richard Walden Operation USA +1 213 658 8876 +1 213 653 7846 walden@opusa.org http://www.opusa.org/opland/index.html 
Mr. Barry C. De Roze Research Eng., Technology 
Integration 
+1 703 681 4753 +1 703 681 7534 derozebc@acq.osd.mil  
   RONCO Consulting 
Corporation 
+1 202 785 2791 +1 202 785 2078, 
+1 202 785 3522 
roncowash@aol.com http://www.demining.com/ 
Mr. Ronald Woodfin Sandia National Laboratories +1 505 844 3111 +1 505 844 7020 rlwoodf@sandia.gov http://www.sandia.gov/media/landmine.htm 
Mr. Barry A. Walrath Science Applications 
International Corporation 
(SAIC) 
+1 703 448 6405 +1 703 821 2038 Barry.A.Walrath@cpmx.saic.com  
Mr. Jacques Baud UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) 
+1 212 9637061,  
+1 212 963 1875 
+1 212 9632498 baud@un.org http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/ 
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Mr. Alastair McAslan UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) 
+1 212 963 2767,  
+1 212 963 1875 
+1 212 963 2498 mcaslan@un.org http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/ 
Mr. Tore Skedsmo UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) 
+1 212 963 2627,  
+1 212 963 1875 
+1 212 963 2498 skedsmo@un.org http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/ 
Mr. Stephen G. Azevedo University of California +1 925 422 8538 +1 925 422 3358 azevedo3@llnl.gov http://www.llnl.gov/str/Azevedo.html, 
http://mir.llnl.gov/ 
Mr. Sean Burke US Army CECOM NVESD +1 703 704 1047 +1 703 704 3001 sburke@nvl.army.mil http://www.demining.brtrc.com/ 
Mr. Randolph P. Eddy US Department of State +1 202 736 4348 +1 202 736 4116   
   US Department of State +1 202 647 0094 +1 202 647 2951  http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_
9809_demine_toc.html 
Col. George Zahaczewsky US Dept. of Defense +1 703 693 5222,  
+1 703 693 5224 
+1 703 693 3039 solicacq@osd.pentagon.mil http://www.demining.brtrc.com/ 
   Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation (VVAF) 
+1 202 483 9222 +1 202 483 6610 bill@vi.org http://www.vvaf.org/landmine/land.html 
Mr. Joseph J. Pallone Marshall Legacy Institute +1 703 836 4747 +1 703 836 4677 marshall_legacy@mail.crc.com  
Mr. Lionel Dyck Mine-Tech +263 4 776 531 +263 4 776 531, 
+263 4 776 6531? 
minetec@harare.iafrica.com  
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